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WHERE IMPROPER PURPOSES LEAD,
INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOLLOW:
INTEGRATING THE RULE 11 IMPROPER
PURPOSE INQUIRY WITH THE RULE 23
PROTECTIONS FOR ABSENT CLASS
MEMBERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The class action is a widely-used litigation device in federal courts
today, and its effects upon the American legal system are garnering
attention from attorneys, scholars, and legislators alike.1 As class actions
become increasingly prevalent and powerful, a schism has developed
between those who support and those who condemn this form of
litigation.2 On one hand, class action opponents assert that class actions
are becoming instruments of “predatory litigation” and question the
motives of both plaintiff class members and class counsel in bringing the
suits.3 On the other hand, supporters insist that even if certain lawsuits
are motivated by a goal other than resolution of the asserted claim, they
are not legally improper, and the filer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to
their legitimacy.4
At the core of this debate is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule
11”) and its requirement that court filings be made without improper
purposes.5 The circuit courts differ in their interpretations of this
1
See infra text accompanying note 19 (introducing generally the uses of the class action
litigation device and the reasons for its wide use and continuing popularity); infra Part II.C
(discussing Congress’ recent passage of the Class Action Fairness Act and its concerns
expressed in the Act).
2
See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (demonstrating several reasons given in
support of class actions, and discussing the concerns and dangers voiced by opponents of
class actions).
3
See infra note 61 (discussing the viewpoint expressed by several scholars, the general
public, and one federal judge, regarding the inherent problems with allowing nonfrivolous but improperly motivated claims to proceed, and examining the Seventh Circuit’s
approach to the problem); infra note 75 (listing several examples of class actions in which
purposes such as inflicting negative media attention and economic impairment on the
defendant arguably outweigh a sincere and central purpose of vindicating a legal claim).
4
See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (examining the Second Circuit’s approach
to Rule 11’s improper motive prong, and its refusal to acknowledge it as a consideration
independent of Rule 11’s requirement of non-frivolousness).
5
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (stating, in pertinent part, that “[b]y presenting to the court . . .
a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that . . . it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation”). See infra note 16
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requirement, and this difference in analysis and application of Rule 11
profoundly impacts the protections guaranteed to absent class members
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) (“Rule 23” or “Rule
23(a)”).6 Specifically, the way a court approaches Rule 11’s improper
motive prong dramatically affects the way that court affords to—or
strips from—absent class members the protections of Rule 23’s typicality
and adequate representation requirements.7
The preservation of these protections for the absent class members is
determinative of whether the absent class members may be
constitutionally bound to the outcome of a lawsuit.8 This Note critically
examines the vital role that purpose and motive play in evaluating
typicality and adequate representation, and demonstrates that the failure
to integrate the Rule 11 motive inquiry with the Rule 23 class certification
requirements will result in binding inadequately represented absent
class members to the outcome of actions pursued for improper motives.9
When courts fail to integrate these salient inquiries, the cost of that
failure is the constitutional due process rights of the inadequately
represented class members.10
Part II of this Note examines the development and role of Rule 11 in
federal litigation, and discusses various circuit courts’ differing
interpretations of Rule 11’s improper purpose requirement.11 Part II
further examines the typicality and adequate representation
requirements of Rule 23(a), and analyzes the overlap between these

(discussing the development of Rule 11 since its inception in 1938, and providing the text of
the current rule); infra note 191 (asserting that the amendments to Rule 11 evidence the
drafters’ intent to preserve the dual-prong structure of Rule 11, demonstrating the
importance of evaluating the improper motive prong independently of the non-frivolous
prong).
6
See infra Part II.B (presenting the Rule 23 class certification requirements of typicality
and adequate representation, and explaining the vital importance and inherent overlap of
Rule 11’s improper motive inquiry with preserving the protections afforded to absent class
members through those Rule 23 requirements).
7
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement and the overlap
with Rule 11’s improper motive inquiry); infra Part II.B.2 (examining the Rule 23(a)(4)
adequate representation requirement and its interplay with the concerns inherent in the
Rule 11 improper motive prong).
8
See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 99-101 (examining the overlap between Rule 11’s
requirement that papers be filed without improper motive and the Rule 23 requirement of
typicality); infra text accompanying notes 127-30 (examining that overlap relative to the
Rule 23 requirement of adequate representation).
10
See infra Part III.C.
11
See infra Part II.
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concerns and Rule 11’s improper purpose prong.12 Next, Part III of this
Note analyzes the various approaches to Rule 11’s improper purpose
prong and explains the effects of each approach on class actions,
focusing specifically on the effects on absent class members.13 Then, Part
IV of this Note proposes Model Judicial Reasoning that both resolves the
tension between the varying Rule 11 interpretations and ensures greater
protection for absent class members as envisioned by Rule 23(a)’s class
certification requirements.14 Finally, Part V of this Note concludes with a
look to the future of the class action as a litigation device relative to the
proposed Model Judicial Reasoning.15
II. BACKGROUND: GETTING LOST ON THE WAY FROM PURPOSE TO
PROTECTIONS
Rule 11 states that an attorney or party may be sanctioned for filing
papers with an improper motive, even if those papers are nonfrivolous.16 However, the circuit courts do not agree on precisely when

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
See infra Part V.
16
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). The original Rule 11 promulgated in 1938 provided a means of
regulating attorney conduct other than the bar’s self-regulation through, for instance, the
Canons of Professional Ethics. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy:
Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty To Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1555, 1564-65 (2001). Brown argues that the drafters of the original Rule 11 were concerned
with preventing abuse of the litigation process by entrepreneurial attorneys, rather than
with deterring or chilling advocacy of novel legal positions or thwarting factually meritless
claims. Id. at 1562 n.21. The courts were reluctant to use the 1938 version of Rule 11, partly
because of the innate hesitation of judges to sanction fellow members of the bar, partly
because the sanctions were wholly discretionary, and partly because it was very difficult to
prove the subjective bad faith necessary to evidence a Rule 11 violation. Michael J.
Mazurczak, Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 91,
98 (1988); see also Brown, supra, at 1565-66. In addition to making sanctions mandatory
upon finding a violation, the amendments to Rule 11 made in 1983 replaced the subjective
bad faith standard for determining a violation of the Rule with objective reasonableness.
Brown, supra, at 1566-67. The 1983 revision sparked a flurry of satellite litigation, arguably
creating a larger problem with frivolous claims and inefficient litigation than it solved. Id.
at 1567-68. The current version of Rule 11 became effective in 1993. Id. at 1570. It again
made sanctions discretionary, but retained the ultimate goal of deterring certain improper
litigation behavior by attorneys and parties. Id. at 1571-74. Thus, the current Rule 11 reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 11.
Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Representations to Court; Sanctions . . .
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is
12
13
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an improper motive exists such that sanctions are appropriate.17 This
schism is especially apparent when the filed paper in question is an
initial claim that appears to be non-frivolous, though possibly prompted
by underlying motives other than the resolution of the legal issues
presented in the claim.18 As the class action becomes an increasingly
popular litigation device for both resolving legal issues and pursuing
“strike suits” intended to pressure large defendants into settlement,
negatively impact a defendant’s economics, or gain media attention, it
becomes imperative that attorneys in both plaintiff and defense bars
closely examine how Rule 11’s mandates affect which class action
lawsuits may properly be filed, and which may lead to sanctions for
“improper motives.”19
Thus, Part II examines the legal foundation and development of Rule
11 and Rule 23, which govern class actions. Part II begins by presenting
Rule 11’s mandates requiring proper motive in all papers filed in federal
courts and explains how varying interpretations of that mandate has
resulted in a split among the circuit courts.20 Part II.A.1 of this section
examines the majority interpretation of Rule 11, which rejects the notion
that a non-frivolous complaint can be filed with “improper motive.”21
Next, Part II.A.2 explains the minority interpretation of Rule 11, which
approves sanctions for filing claims based on an improper motive, even
though it presents non-frivolous legal issues.22 Part II.B then presents the
certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based
on a lack of information or belief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
17
See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 31, 41 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
20
See infra Part II.A.
21
See infra Part II.A.1.
22
See infra Part II.A.2.
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basic requirements of class action certification under Rule 23, focusing
specifically on the requirements of typicality and adequate
representation, and its overlapping concerns with Rule 11.23 Part II.C
concludes with a brief look at the concerns recently professed by
Congress regarding class action lawsuits and the motivations behind
those suits that may fall well within the ambit of Rule 11’s “improper
motive” prohibitions.24
A. Competing Interpretations of Rule 11: A Fork in the Path Toward Proper
Purpose
Despite the text of Rule 11, which forbids filing papers with
improper motive and provides no exceptions to that prohibition, some
federal circuits have ruled that, especially where the filing in question is
an initial complaint, Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate only if the filing is
frivolous.25 On one hand, Rule 11 asserts that sanctions are appropriate
where papers are filed with an improper motive and gives no textual
credence to the idea that an exception for initial complaints may exist.26
On the other hand, judges, lawyers, and commentators alike seek to
protect the freedom of petition embodied in the First Amendment and
they express fear that freedom to petition may be chilled if Rule 11 is
asserted too vigorously.27 These competing concerns have produced
competing schools of thought in the federal court system.28
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
25
The Ninth Circuit famously held that “a defendant cannot be harassed under Rule 11
because a plaintiff files a complaint against that defendant which complies with the ‘well
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law’ clause of the Rule.” Zaldivar v. City of
Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, the court noted that the filing of
excessive motions, even if the motions are non-frivolous, may be harassment and
sanctionable under Rule 11. Id.
26
See Mazurczak, supra note 16, at 106 (noting that the improper purpose clause of Rule
11 is a second and distinct prong from the “frivolousness clause” of the Rule). Mazurczak
describes the improper purpose portion of Rule 11 as addressing “the problem of misusing
judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic harassment” and is therefore
“not limited to papers filed in bad faith.” Id. Further, while the 1938 version of Rule 11
noted only “delay” as an improper purpose, the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 added
harassment and unnecessary increase in litigation costs as further illustrations of improper
purposes, and does not suggest that the provided list of “improper” purposes is
exhaustive. Id. The 1993 amendment to Rule 11 did not change the improper purpose
prong of the Rule. Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit
Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 727, 727-28 n.2 (2004).
27
In the dissent to the Seventh Circuit’s oft-cited Szabo Food Services, Inc. opinion, Circuit
Judge Cudahy lamented the majority’s decision to sanction a colorable claim for improper
purposes because “[d]ue process, unfortunately, is an area where creativity and frivolity
sometimes threaten to merge . . . . [T]he chilling effect of today’s decision will reach as
23
24
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Majority View: Bypassing the Purpose Prong

Of the federal courts to directly address the question of whether
sanctions are appropriate for improperly motivated but non-frivolous
claims, a majority of courts hold that sanctions are not appropriate.29
The Second Circuit, adopting the position advocated by the Ninth
Circuit, has explained that a complaint well-grounded in law and fact is
inherently brought with a proper purpose.30 Thus, the Second and Ninth
Circuits espouse the idea that a non-frivolous claim cannot, by objective
definition, be one motivated by improper purpose.31

tellingly to the most meritorious such claim as to the least.” Szabo Food Service, Inc. v.
Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1987). For further discussion of Szabo, see
infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
28
See In re Pennie & Edmonds L.L.P, 323 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that “If
the sanction regime is too severe, lawyers will sometimes be deterred from making
legitimate submissions on behalf of clients out of apprehension that their conduct will
erroneously be deemed improper. On the other hand, if the sanction regime is too lenient,
lawyers will sometimes be emboldened to make improper submissions on behalf of clients,
confident that their misconduct will either be undetected or dealt with too leniently to
matter”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)
(describing the challenge before the courts as “constru[ing] the Rule in a manner that will
promote the goal of limiting harassment, delay and expense, without impeding zealous
advocacy or freezing the common law in the status quo”). See accord Jeff Goland, Note, In
re Pennie & Edmonds: The Second Circuit Returns to a Subjective Standard of Bad Faith for
Imposing Post-Trial Sua Sponte Rule 11 Sanctions, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 449, 477 (2004)
(explaining the policy behind Rule 11 as a “search for a proper balance between a lawyer’s
ability to submit all legitimate claims on behalf of clients and the courts’ interest in
maintaining the functionality and integrity of the legal system”).
29
See generally Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Sanctions for Non-frivolous Complaints?
Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1998) (observing that of the two “divergent views” professed by the
circuits, the majority position reflects the Ninth Circuit’s notion that neither party nor
attorney should be deterred from bringing a claim even if the purposes behind the claim
are not “entirely pure”).
30
Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995). See Kruzansky, supra note 29,
at 1375 (stating that the Second Circuit by its decision in Sussman aligned itself with the
“majority camp”).
31
See, e.g., Kruzansky, supra note 29, at 1375 (noting that these circuits hold that when a
complaint is non-frivolous, improper purpose claims must fail based on the idea that
colorable claims embody a proper purpose). However, the courts are not blind to the plain
language of Rule 11. The Ninth Circuit Court all but confessed a blatant refusal to follow
the language of the Rule:
The plain language of Rule 11 suggests that the frivolous filings clause
and the improper purposes clause are independent; that is, a signer
can violate the Rule by filing a frivolous paper even though not done
for an improper purpose or, conversely, a signer can violate the Rule
by filing a harassing paper even though it is not frivolous on the
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The Second Circuit first addressed this issue in Sussman v. Bank of
Israel.32 In Sussman, the Israeli government, forced to cover depositors’
losses via its Bank of Israel, brought suit against several of the officers
and directors of North American Bank Ltd. (“NAB”), claiming
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.33 As the Israeli action against
the NAB officers neared its trial date, Nathan Lewin, attorney for two of
the defendants located in the United States, informed the Israeli
government that his clients wished to bring a counterclaim in the United
States.34 In his letters to the Israeli government, Lewin emphatically
urged a settlement discussion, noting the likely and severe damage to
Israel’s foreign investment market if the American lawsuit was filed.35
Undeterred by Lewin’s emphatic suggestions of negative publicity
and pressure toward settlement, the Israeli government pursued their
civil action, prompting Lewin to file suit in New York.36 Upon the suit’s
dismissal based on forum non conveniens, the defendants moved for an
award of sanctions against Lewin.37 The defendants claimed the suit was
merits. Despite the language of the Rule, we have held that the two
clauses are not totally independent.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 855 F.2d at 1475-76 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
also acknowledged that its interpretation of Rule 11 is suggested by neither the Rule’s text
nor structure, and that the Rule provides no basis for treating complaints differently than
other filed papers. In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994). Compare Jeffrey Neal Cole,
Rule 11 Now, 17 No. 3 LITIGATION 10, 50 (1991) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to
interpret either prong of Rule 11 as having a subjective strand running through it), with
Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that Rule 11 contains two
separate grounds for sanctions: the “reasonable inquiry” clause and the “improper
purpose” clause, and as such, the former is measured by objective standards whereas the
latter requires consideration of subjective standards).
32
56 F.3d 450, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1995).
33
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 452. The suit and countersuit stemmed from the failure of an
Israeli Bank, North American Bank Ltd. (“NAB”), and resultant allegations of fraud,
embezzlement, and mismanagement. Id.
34
Id. at 453.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 454. The doctrine permits a district court to “decline” jurisdiction, even though
all technical venue requirements were met, when allowing the case to proceed in that
district would result in severe inconvenience to the litigants and witnesses in the matter. In
re Dalkon Shield Litig., 581 F. Supp. 135, 139 (D. Md. 1983). The district court called the
Sussman case a “quintessential case for application of the forum non conveniens doctrine”
even while acknowledging that some degree of deference should be given to the forum
preferences of Sussman, a United States resident, and the administrators of Guilden’s
estate, which was being administered in New York. Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 801 F. Supp.
1068, 1074, 1079 (1992), aff’d, 990 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). The district court
rejected the forum selected by the Sussman plaintiffs in favor of Israel based on the forum
non conveniens doctrine for a laundry list of reasons. The Second Circuit summarized the
district court:
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brought for the improper purpose of “forc[ing] the withdrawal of the
Israeli action by threatening . . . negative publicity.”38 The district court
agreed with the defendants and sanctioned Lewin for $50,000.39
However, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling,
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis from Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp.40 In the Townsend opinion, the Ninth Circuit determined
that “it would be counterproductive to use Rule 11 to penalize the
assertion of non-frivolous substantive claims, even when the motives for
asserting those claims are not entirely pure. . . . [A] determination of
improper purpose must be supported by a determination of
frivolousness when a complaint is at issue.”41 The Second Circuit quoted
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in its Sussman analysis, adding that “A party
should not be penalized for or deterred from seeking . . . judicial relief
merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking that relief may
have been improper.”42
Further, the Second Circuit has explicitly proclaimed its adherence to
an objective standard for Rule 11 review, stating that “there is no
necessary subjective component to a proper Rule 11 analysis.”43 The
Ninth Circuit similarly explained that “[a]n attorney’s subjective intent

[A]ll of the claims in the New York complaint would be governed by
Israeli law; that Sussman and Guilden had voluntarily elected to invest
in Israel; and that parallel litigation arising out of the same alleged
conduct was already proceeding [in Israel] . . . [and] the New York
conduct “cannot be regarded, in the overall scheme of things, as other
than peripheral” to alleged acts and omissions “occurring entirely in
Israel.”
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 454 (citing Sussman, 801 F. Supp. at 1074).
38
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 455.
39
Id. (noting that the district court imposed sanctions based solely upon “the manifestly
improper purpose which played a significant part in plaintiffs’ motivation for filing their
complaint”) (quoting Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 154 F.R.D. 68, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
40
929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
41
Id. at 1362; accord Westlake North Prop. Owners v. Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301,
1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that no non-frivolous papers, even those other than
complaints, can violate Rule 11, no matter what subjective reasons may exist for their
filing).
42
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459. The Second Circuit also indicated that the purposes behind
Lewin’s complaint may not be “improper” at all, noting that a filing entered to “exert[ ]
pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse and economically
disadvantageous publicity” may not be improper so long as it did not lack a foundation in
law or fact. Id.
43
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986); accord Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t
Employees v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (declaring
that subjective bad faith “is no longer an element in Rule 11 inquiries”).
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in filing is . . . irrelevant to the Rule 11 analysis.”44 The Second and
Ninth Circuits are joined in this analysis by the Fifth Circuit, which
strictly limits its Rule 11 sanctions for improper purpose to those
situations in which clear, objective evidence belies an improper
purpose.45
For instance, in Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc.,46 the
plaintiff sued the Kmart store where she had been abducted from its
parking lot and raped.47 The court entered a judgment against Kmart in
the amount of $3.4 million pursuant to the jury’s determination that
Kmart negligently failed to provide parking lot security.48 The plaintiff’s
attorney secured a writ of execution from the court and promptly
notified the media of his intent to execute the judgment by seizing cash
from Kmart’s registers and vaults.49 Indeed, the attorney, two U.S.
Marshals, and reporters, descended upon Kmart as planned, but their
attempt to execute the judgment was thwarted when the district court
stayed the execution.50
On appeal of the stay of execution, the Fifth Circuit found, for the
first time in its jurisprudence, that unusual circumstances existed to
support sanctioning the attorney’s filing that requested the writ of
execution.51 The majority’s opinion contrasts with the Second Circuit’s
Sussman opinion, in which the court had determined that economically
harmful publicity was not an improper motive.52 Instead, in Whitehead,
the Fifth Circuit declared not only that embarrassing Kmart was an
44
Westlake North Prop. Owners, 915 F.2d at 1305. Ninth Circuit jurisprudence is not
unanimous on this point and cases exist in which courts appear to consider the improper
motive prong of Rule 11 separately from the non-frivolous prong: one district court found
an attorney’s contentions as factually groundless and unwarranted by existing law,
rendering the claim “frivolous” under Rule 11. WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File, 103 F.R.D.
417, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). However, the court also determined that the claim was
interposed for an improper purpose: the pursuit of economic or political objectives. Id. at
421. In fact, the court supported its determination with evidence of counsel’s choice of
litigation tactics, noting that if plaintiffs had actually wanted the relief they purported to
seek, they would have sought injunctive relief from the state court instead of “cho[osing]
instead to commence complex and burdensome litigation” in the federal court system. Id.
at 420.
45
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, 844 F.2d at 224.
46
332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003).
47
Id. at 799. The rape did not take place at the Kmart store; however, the abduction that
led to the rape occurred in the store’s parking lot. Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 800.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 808 (describing the sanctioned attorney’s conduct as “exceptional”).
52
Id. at 808-09; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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improper motive, but that it actually far outweighed any legitimate
motive that might possibly exist.53 As discussed by Judge Carolyn
Dineen King in her dissent, the Fifth Circuit uses an “unusual or
exceptional circumstances” analysis in determining whether sanctions
for improper purpose are appropriate.54 Judge King noted that until the
decision at hand, the Fifth Circuit “ha[d] not found a case with such
‘unusual circumstances’ to merit upholding an ‘improper purpose’
finding” where the filing in question was non-frivolous.55 Judge King
specifically criticized the Fifth Circuit majority for failing to give proper
weight to the possible legitimate purposes behind the attorney’s filing.56
Thus, Whitehead functions as the exception proving the rule: except
for the Whitehead court’s rarely invoked “unusual or exceptional
circumstances” test, courts following the majority view refuse to
acknowledge improper motive sufficient to violate Rule 11 so long as the
underlying claim is minimally colorable.57 Courts adhering to the
minority view, however, weigh the improper motive prong of Rule 11 as
a separate consideration, distinct and independent from the Rule 11
requirement that the claim be non-frivolous.58

53
Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 808–09. It is interesting to contrast this decision with the Second
Circuit’s discussion in Sussman. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. If the Sussman
court reviewed the Whitehead case, Judge King’s dissent arguably could carry the day based
on the Sussman court’s assertion that the generation of adverse and economically harmful
publicity is not an improper motive. Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459. This illustrates a sub-split
within the circuit split and the difficulty courts face when deciding Rule 11 cases: where
the Fifth Circuit sees “mixed purposes” with improper purposes outweighing the proper
purposes, the Second Circuit sees no improper purpose at all.
54
Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 813 (King, J., dissenting).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 814 (calling the sanctioned attorney’s tactics “colorful” but advocating greater
tolerance for arguably-borderline litigation strategies, especially in debt-collection
situations where such tactics may be more common). In fact, a divided panel of the Fifth
Circuit had previously reversed the imposition of sanctions, holding that although the
attorney’s intent to publicly embarrass Kmart was improper, he had a legitimate purpose
in attempting to execute a valid judgment. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 277 F.3d
791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 2002). The panel used the same “exceptional circumstances” test that
the Fifth Circuit court, en banc, used when it affirmed the imposition of the sanctions. Id. at
796. The panel’s refusal to affirm the sanctions comported with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence,
in which an attorney’s mixed purposes behind a filing—some legitimate, some improper—
had never been held sufficiently unusual or exceptional to justify sanctions. Whitehead, 332
F.3d at 813 (King, J., dissenting).
57
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
58
See, e.g., infra note 61.
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Minority View: Forging a Path Toward Proper Purpose

The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that courts can, and
should, impose sanctions when a complaint is filed for an improper
motive, even if that complaint is non-frivolous.59 In its oft-quoted and
frequently analyzed case, Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., the
Seventh Circuit explained its perspective regarding Rule 11 challenges:
Much of [the plaintiff’s] brief in this court is devoted to a
demonstration that it had an objectively sufficient basis
for its claim of racial discrimination. Perhaps it can
persuade the district court that it did, but this is not
enough. Because Rule 11 has a subjective component as
well, the district court must find out why [the plaintiff]
pursued this litigation. The Rule effectively picks up the
torts of abuse of process (filing an objectively frivolous
suit) and malicious prosecution (filing a colorable suit
for the purpose of imposing expense on the defendant
rather than for the purpose of winning).60
Thus, the Seventh Circuit unambiguously established its position with
the minority of the circuits by forthrightly declaring that an objectively
non-frivolous claim is insufficient to shield a filer from sanctions, and
instructing courts to evaluate subjectively why litigants and attorneys
bring their complaints.61

59
Kruzansky, supra note 29, at 1382 (observing that of the circuit courts that have
directly addressed courts’ ability to sanction the filing of non-frivolous complaints brought
for an improper purpose, only the Seventh Circuit has “ruled repeatedly . . . that a court
may freely impose sanctions under such circumstances”).
60
823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
61
The Szabo court borrowed the accusation of “predatory litigation” from the arena of
antitrust litigation, and stated that “[p]erhaps [those arguments] have substance here too.”
Id. at 1082-83. The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that Rule 11 embodies both a
subjective and objective component, and the subjective component requires a court to
investigate why a litigant pursued the litigation. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990
F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1993); Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th
Cir. 1989); Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1083; In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985). The
Seventh Circuit’s position may actually closely comport with the changes to the legal
system deemed necessary by the public. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 85, 92, 107 (1994) (asserting that
as officers of the court, lawyers should temper their zeal for representing their clients with
their professional responsibility dictated by the “rules of law and principles of professional
ethics,” but noting that popular dissatisfaction still occurs because some cases “are pursued
and presented because they are deemed to have vexation value”). Re also observes that
“The public perceives that lawyers file every conceivable type of case, regardless of merit.
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Likewise, in Kapco Manufacturing Co. v. C & O Enterprises, Inc.,62 the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position that Rule 11 “forbids the filing of
pleadings that are interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or . . . needless[ly] increase[ ] cost of litigation.”63 The Seventh
Circuit sharply answered the plaintiff attorney’s suggestion that calling
litigation a “civilized bloodless war between the parties” was “merely
stat[ing] the obvious; it does not provide a showing that [the plaintiff]
has asserted frivolous and baseless claims.”64 The court held that,
contrary to plaintiff counsel’s assertion, a district court is not required to
find plaintiff’s claims frivolous or baseless in order to justify the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.65
Courts in the Fourth Circuit closely align with the Seventh Circuit’s
jurisprudence, though the Seventh Circuit remains the most stalwart and
consistent of the minority circuits in its application of Rule 11.66 In the
As a result, the quality of cases filed with the courts has burdened court dockets and
threatens the quality of justice.” Id. See also Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1529, 1570 (1996) (declaring that “[f]rivolous lawsuits waste limited judicial resources
and clog the courts’ dockets, preventing or delaying access to justice to other plaintiffs with
meritorious claims”). Accord Kevin Thomas Duffy, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, The Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 20, 20 (1985). Duffy presents a federal judge’s perspective on the
dissatisfaction surrounding lawyers’ filings of frivolous or improper suits and arguing for
stricter self-regulation rather than strong reliance on the judiciary to thwart the problem:
Why do lawyers bring stupid, senseless, baseless lawsuits? Because
they get away with it. The organized bar itself is supposed to watch
out for the activities of lawyers. Has the organized bar met its own
requirements? Are lawyers still bringing stupid, senseless, baseless
lawsuits? Sure. Why aren’t they disbarred? Well, they are not, and it
is quite obvious to the judiciary that if the organized bar is not going to
clean its own house then somebody has got to do something about it.
Isn’t it nice of the organized bar to say, “Hey we have got a problem,
let’s pass it off to the judiciary.”
Id.
62
886 F.2d 1485 (7th Cir. 1989).
63
Id. at 1491 (citing Brown v. Fed’n of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir.
1987)).
64
Id. at 1493.
65
It is interesting to note, however, that the district court found the plaintiff’s claims
frivolous and baseless, but the Seventh Circuit clearly indicates that the imposition of
sanctions was warranted, notwithstanding that finding. Id.
66
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit takes a more
compromising view of Rule 11’s two separate prongs than does the Seventh Circuit, as the
Fourth Circuit advocates first examining whether a pleading is well-grounded in law and
fact, declaring that “will often influence the determination of the signer’s purpose.” In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990). Thus, the Fourth Circuit subtly blurs the line
between the two prongs of Rule 11, allowing the weight of one prong to affect the weight
given to the other. Id. This is not to suggest, however, that the Fourth Circuit is not still in
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much-cited In re Kunstler ruling, the Fourth Circuit declined to rule
definitively on the issue, stating that the complaint at issue lacked basis
in law or fact and that the court “need not decide whether a complaint
which is well grounded in law and in fact can be sanctioned solely on the
basis that it was filed for an improper purpose.”67 The Fourth Circuit
went on to explain that:
If a complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its
purpose must be improper. However, if a complaint is
filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for some other
purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an
intention that the court does not approve, so long as the
added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not
so excessive as to eliminate a proper purpose. Thus, the
purpose to vindicate rights in court must be central and
sincere.68
Thus, even though the court expressly refused to rule on the issue, it
took the opportunity to indicate, in dicta, that it was holding open the
possibility for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in a non-frivolous
claim based on the improper purpose prong.69
Later decisions from lower courts in the Fourth Circuit support the
Kunstler court’s dicta. The District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina stated that even a pleading well-grounded in law or fact can
violate Rule 11 if it is filed for an improper purpose.70 The court further
explained that Rule 11 “has a subjective component as well,” and that
sanctions are appropriately imposed where “one of the main reasons [for
filing suit] was to harass [the defendant], an improper purpose under
Rule 11.”71 Thus, while each circuit that has addressed the issue notes its

agreement with the Seventh Circuit on the point of whether or not to sanction a nonfrivolous claim when it is filed for an improper purpose. See, e.g., Cohen v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 1986) (determining that plaintiff had a sanctionable
improper purpose where plaintiff planned to withdraw a factually and legally supportable
motion if the opposing party resisted); Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117, 122
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (concluding that “Rule 11 has a subjective component as well [and]
[s]ubjective bad faith may be considered when the suit is objectively colorable”).
67
914 F.2d at 518.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Ballentine, 135 F.R.D. at 125.
71
Id. at 124-25 (“The correct focus is upon the improper purpose of the signer, and such
purpose must be determined from the motive of the signer in pursuing the suit. The
subjective beliefs of the injured party are not relevant, and the Court must look at more
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importance and the disparate interpretations of the Rule, no uniform
interpretation of the improper motive prong has been established or
adopted. While this is a troubling enough problem in individual
litigation, it is exceptionally alarming as applied to federal class actions.
B. Class Action Certification Requirements Under Rule 23(a): Setting the
Compass to “Adequate Protections”
Concerns regarding improper motives underlying the filing of
claims are perhaps nowhere more acute than in the realm of class
actions.72 Class actions often provide the potential for large fee payouts
for the class’s attorney, as well as negative media attention and
economically harmful litigation for the defendant.73 The class action
litigation device not only provides plaintiffs a means for bringing
otherwise economically unfeasible claims, but also provides incentives
for attorneys that may well be deemed “improper,” as there may be
personal and economic motives for acquiring the large fees common in
class actions.74

objective evidence of the signer’s purpose. This does require consideration of the signer’s
subjective belief.”) (internal citations omitted).
72
See, e.g., Michelle Connell, Comment, Full Faith and Credit Clause: A Defense to
Nationwide Class Action Certification?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1041, 1041, 1055 (2003)
(explaining that the original policy reasons behind the class action litigation device,
including judicial efficiency and avoidance of duplicative litigation, are “lost” as the
viability of plaintiffs’ arguably harassing claims increases, and the attorneys’ fees increase
as well); see also Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The
Barrister and The Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 650 (1989) (noting increases in the number of
cases in which a class of plaintiffs stand to win only small recoveries, but the attorneys
stand to gain large fees). Weinstein also observes the possibility of “small litigants” guided
by “sharply aggressive plaintiff’s counsel” using tactics including harassing discovery
requests to force a “big” defendant into settlement. Id.
73
See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 736 (1998) (accusing attorneys of “sell[ing] out the
public’s interest” in mass tort litigation suits to the lawyers for high attorney fees). Gordon
also calls for reforms in the civil justice system to halt the “pollution” of the system by its
attorneys through their evasion of and maneuvering around those rules—and Gordon uses
Rule 11 as an example—that would keep in check such ethical dilemmas as pursuing
claims for high attorney fees more so than (or instead of) pursuing them for the public’s or
client’s interest. Id. at 736-37. See also Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice
Through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 AM U. L. REV. 1573, 1615 (1997) (calling for
national tort reform to protect defendants from “undeserved and excessive” monetary
judgments against them). Pace asserts that instead of being a legitimate tool for social
reform, excessive awards are being demanded too often, making “[m]ultimillion dollar
punitive awards . . . the rule rather than the exception” and thereby threatening “the
stability of American industry.” Id. at 1638 n.220.
74
See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG.
79, 104-05 (1994). Bone contends that mass tort cases and “small claimant” class action

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/6

Bracke: Where Improper Purposes Lead, Inadequate Protections Follow: Int

2006]

Integrating Rule 11 with Rule 23

367

Arguably improper motives may affect the plaintiffs as well, as some
claimants may utilize the class action device not to seek resolution of
their legal issue, but to inflict negative media attention and economic
impairment upon the defendant.75 The class action device does not
include any specific or explicit consideration of the motives of plaintiffs
or attorneys.76 However, the factors a court must consider before
certifying a class are not independent of motive considerations,
suits share a danger in the attorneys’ motivation for high fees. Id. Bone even notes that the
attorney’s motivation for high fees can essentially pollute the class representative plaintiff’s
motivation for the suit or the settlement:
Attorneys tend to control the litigation without much oversight by
clients. This feature encourages wasteful strategic maneuvering as
each lawyer jockeys for a position in the litigation that will assure her a
maximum fee. Even when the class representative actually monitors
class counsel, there is a risk that the class attorney and the class
representative will collude with the defendant to reach a settlement
that treats the lawyer and representative more favorably than
absentees.
Id. Accord Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (2004)
(showing attorneys’ fees as percentages of overall class recovery in class action settlements
from 1993-2003, and noting the mean percentage of the recovery going to the attorneys as
26.4%, and the median being 25.0%).
75
Pace, supra note 73, at 1638; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298
(7th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern about plaintiffs who use class action lawsuits as a means
of extracting “blackmail settlements” from defendants); Richard H. Underwood, Legal
Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 KY. L.J. 787, 817-18 (1983)
(noting that the class action device has been described as “legalized blackmail” and that
class actions may be used as “leverage for coercing unmerited settlements”). National
news publications also take cynical shots at class action lawsuits that ring insincere, despite
plaintiff’s insistence to the contrary. See, e.g., Shannon Brownlee, Portion Distortion: You
Don’t Know the Half of It, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at B5 (describing with incredulity a
class action filed against McDonald’s by a mother who insisted that she “believed
McDonald’s food was healthy for [her] son”). In fact, the national news media may
actually help create a plaintiff class where none previously existed, thus casting doubt
upon the integrity of the suit by calling into question which came first: the plaintiff’s
injury, thereby necessitating a defendant from whom to recover damages, or the plaintiff’s
awareness of damages to be recovered from a defendant, thereby necessitating an injury?
See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting that plaintiffs started pursuing claims against the defendant following a television
news story on 20/20 examining the screws used during spinal fusion surgery); Deborah R.
Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal
Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1021 (1993) (asserting that an article in the National Enquirer
spurred a class action focusing on a medication (Bendectin), and that a story from the
television show 60 Minutes prompted litigation regarding an intrauterine contraceptive
device (Dalkon Shield)).
76
See infra note 78; see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23. However, the federal rule leaves open
the door to such inquiries into an attorney’s motives. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(ii)
(instructing the court to consider “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class”).
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especially the prongs of Rule 23(a) which require a determination of
typicality and adequate representation.77
Before considering how Rule 11 considerations should affect a
judge’s evaluation of class certification, especially the factors of typicality
and adequate representation, it is helpful to first review the structure
and function of class actions established by Rule 23(a).78 Ideally, class
actions “promot[e] judicial economy through the efficient resolution of
multiple claims in one case, and . . . provide an opportunity for persons
with small claims to assert their rights.”79 Plaintiffs petitioning a court
for class certification must identify the class members; that is, plaintiffs
must “define” the class.80 The court then must ascertain whether the
See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) states, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
79
L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”:
Using Daubert To Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1041, 1044 (2004). Regarding judicial economy, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
701 (1979), in which the Court noted that as long as membership in the class is properly
limited, class treatment of certain suits “is consistent with the need for case-by-case
adjudication.” However, courts have also noted that because of the tangible and powerful
impact plaintiff class actions may have on defendants, courts must exercise cautious review
of class actions brought. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
739-40 (1975) (stating relative to securities lawsuits that “There has been widespread
recognition that [class action litigation] presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general. . . . We believe that
the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation which could result from a
widely expanded class of plaintiffs . . . is founded in something more substantial than the
common complaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding lawsuits entirely to
either settling them or trying them”).
80
The putative class must be “precise, objective, and presently ascertainable” such that
the court is able to determine who is included in the class and who is therefore entitled to
relief and bound by the judgment. Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 174 F.R.D. 425, 431 (D.
Wis. 1997); Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 156 (D. Kan. 1996). Thus, “[d]efinitions,
particularly under [Rule 23](b)(3), should avoid criteria that are subjective (e.g., a plaintiff’s
state of mind) or that depend on the merits (e.g., persons who were discriminated
against).” Rozema, 174 F.R.D. at 431 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a class whose definition
depended upon each class member’s state of mind was not sufficiently definite). While
definition of the class is an “essential prerequisite,” the class definition must be only as
precise as necessary to make it “administratively feasible” for a court to determine whether
a particular individual is a member of the class. Stewart v. Assocs. Consumer Disc. Co.,
183 F.R.D. 189, 198 (D. Pa. 1998); Sharp v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 34, 36 (E.D.
77
78
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putative class members meet the four requirements of Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.81
Of these four requirements, typicality and adequate representation
are most pertinent to the Rule 11 inquiry.82 The typicality prong requires
scrutiny of the incentives of a putative class representative to ensure that
those incentives are closely enough aligned with the incentives of all
class members to make the putative representative a proper advocate for
all the class members’ interests in the suit.83 Thus, the concerns of Rule
11 and typicality overlap because both require a court to consider the
motives, and the incentives underlying those motives, of class
representatives.
The adequate representation prong requires a court to determine
whether the putative class representatives and the putative class counsel
will sufficiently and zealously present the interests of all the class
members.84 The Rule 11 concerns of improper motive overlap with this

Mo. 1972). Case law makes clear the notion that class definitions must be precise and
objective so as to make it administratively feasible to determine which individuals are class
members and which are not. Stewart, 183 F.R.D. at 198; Zapata, 167 F.R.D. at 156. However,
it is vital to note that the notion of “objectiveness” and rejecting class definitions based on
“state of mind” refer to the putative plaintiff’s state of mind and subjective opinion as it
relates to the injury purportedly suffered. See, e.g., Simer, 661 F.2d at 669. This is an
entirely different inquiry than the subjective purpose behind filing and pursuing a
particular claim, as the former inquiry focuses on an injury as defined by a state of mind,
whereas the latter inquiry focuses on why a litigant brings the claim, regardless of what
injury is asserted.
81
See supra note 78. Indeed, courts are required to evaluate the presence of each of Rule
23(a)’s requirements before certifying a class; it is insufficient for a motion for certification
to merely recite the language of Rule 23 without providing basic facts indicating that each
requirement under the Rule is actually fulfilled. Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 449 F.2d
1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving
to the court that each of Rule 23’s requirements are met. See, e.g., Fertig v. Blue Cross of
Iowa, 68 F.R.D. 53, 56 (D. Iowa 1974); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361, 371 (D.S.C. 1974);
Howard N. Gorney, The Importance of Good Faith in Fraudulent Transfer Analysis, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Mar. 2003, at 51 (noting that proving the affirmative existence of any element of a
lawsuit is far easier than attempting to demonstrate the absence of a fact or element).
82
See infra notes 83-85, and accompanying text.
83
See generally Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); Taliaferro v. State Council of
Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1387 (E.D. Va. 1974).
84
See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Prior to the 2003 amendments to
Rule 23, the adequacy of class counsel was evaluated only under the adequate
representation prong. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). However, the amendments effected on
December 1, 2003, created subsection (g), which provides courts with guidelines for
examining the class counsel’s qualifications independently from the adequacy of the
named representative. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). The Advisory Committee explained that the
amendment
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determination, as class representatives or class counsel with motives that
differ from those of the absent class members may not be, by definition,
adequate representatives of those absent class members’ interests.85
1.

Typicality

Typicality requires, as its name suggests, that the claims of the
named plaintiffs be typical of the claims of the class.86 The typicality
prong requires that a court examine whether the issue in dispute
occupies the same degree of importance and centrality to the named
plaintiffs’ claim as that issue would occupy for all other class members’
claims.87 Moreover, the named representatives’ interests should coincide
with the interests of the “absent class members,” that is, all the other
parties encompassed by the class definition but not actively involved in
the litigation as named representatives.88
Because the named
representative is asserting claims and purportedly seeking vindication of
certain rights on behalf of a class, typicality requires the judge to

responds to the reality that the selection and activity of class counsel
are often critically important to the successful handling of a class
action. Until now, courts have scrutinized proposed class counsel as
well as the class representative under Rule 23(a)(4). This experience
has recognized the importance of judicial evaluation of the proposed
lawyer for the class, and this new subdivision builds on that
experience rather than introducing an entirely new element into the
class certification process. Rule 23(a)(4) will continue to call for
scrutiny of the proposed class representative, while this subdivision
will guide the court in assessing proposed class counsel as part of the
certification decision. This subdivision recognizes the importance of
class counsel, states the obligation to represent the interests of the
class, and provides a framework for selection of class counsel.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory comm.’s note.
85
See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
86
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
87
See, e.g., Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147; Taliaferro, 372 F. Supp. at 1387 (noting that the
typicality requirement affords protection to class members against unwarranted or
unnecessary involvement of their legal rights by representatives whose stake in the
proceeding is dissimilar).
88
The typicality requirement must guarantee that the interests asserted by the named
representative are coextensive with those of the class members in order to ensure that no
class member’s claim (nor significant aspects of any member’s claim) will be unrepresented
or underrepresented by the named plaintiffs. Kaminski v. Shawmut Credit Union, 416 F.
Supp. 1119, 1123 (D. Mass. 1976); Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 66
F.R.D. 581, 587 (D. Pa. 1975).
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evaluate whether the representatives’ claims and interests are properly
aligned with those of the absent class members.89
The main purpose of typicality, despite factual variations in the
representatives’ and absent class members’ claims, is to ensure that the
named plaintiffs act on behalf of and safeguard the interests of the
class.90 Typicality calls for the class representatives to have suffered
injury in the same general fashion as the absent class members so that
the legal arguments and assertions presented by the named
representatives will fairly and vigorously encompass those likely to be
made by the absent class members.91 Thus, Rule 23’s typicality
requirement supports the adequate representation requirement as well
because when the named representatives’ claims are typical of the class,
they will have great incentive to support their claims and will advance
the claims of the class members.92
For example, in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon,93
the named plaintiff class representative alleged disparate treatment,
claiming that he did not receive a promotion at the defendant
corporation because he was Mexican-American.94 Named plaintiff
Falcon sought to represent all Mexican-Americans who had been or
might have been adversely affected by the defendant’s alleged
discriminatory practices.95 The Supreme Court held that the district
court erred when it presumed that named plaintiff Falcon’s claim was
typical of the class he sought to represent.96 The Court explained that
even when the named plaintiff alleges racial discrimination, which the
Court referred to as “by definition class discrimination,” typicality

89
Thus, pursuant to this prerequisite to class certification, the interests of the named
plaintiff cannot be antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the putative class.
Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). However, typicality is not negated
simply because some factual variations exist between the named plaintiffs’ claims and
those of the absent class members. Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 34
(D.D.C. 2003).
90
Littlewolf v. Hodel, 681 F. Supp. 929, 935 (D.D.C. 1988).
91
Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 34; Thomas v. Christopher, 169 F.R.D. 224, 238 (D.D.C. 1996).
92
See infra, Part II.B.2; see also Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
93
457 U.S. 147 (1982).
94
Id. at 149.
95
Id. at 150-51. Falcon described the putative class as “‘composed of Mexican-American
persons who are employed, or who might be employed, by GENERAL TELEPHONE
COMPANY at its place of business located in Irving, Texas, who have been and who
continue to be or might be adversely affected by the practices complained of herein.’” Id. at
151.
96
Id. at 158.
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cannot be presumed or inferred.97 In order to demonstrate that Falcon’s
claim was sufficiently “typical” of the class he sought to represent, the
Court stated that he must prove, inter alia, that the discrimination he
alleged was typical of the defendant’s promotion practices, and that the
defendant’s other employment practices (such as hiring) also involved
the alleged policy of discrimination in the same way it was involved in
the promotion practices.98
Thus, Rule 11’s requirement of filing papers without improper
motive overlaps with Rule 23’s requirement of typicality because a
putative class representative whose motives were improper—that is,
whose driving interest in the case was something other than the legal
issues presented on the face of the claim—would not fairly and
vigorously encompass the interests of the absent class members whose
motives would be proper.99 Where a putative class representative is
motivated by interests other than those expressed by the claim’s legal
issues, that party cannot be expected to simultaneously safeguard the
interests of all absent class members for whom the legal issues
themselves are the primary motivation because the putative
representative’s interests would not properly “coincide” with the absent
class members’ interests.100 Moreover, the putative representative who
files a claim motivated by interests other than the legal claims at stake
could not accurately be described as holding the legal issues to the same
degree of importance and centrality as those absent class members
motivated solely by the resolution of those legal issues.101
2.

Adequate Representation

In addition to typicality, a putative class representative must
demonstrate adequate representation.102 The party or parties named as
97
Id. at 157. In fact, the burden of proof for all of Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites is on the
plaintiff, and the class action device under Rule 23 may not be used unless and until the
plaintiff meets the burden for each prerequisite. Thompson v. T. F. I. Cos., 64 F.R.D. 140,
148 (D. Ill. 1974).
98
Id. at 158.
99
See supra text accompanying note 91.
100
See supra note 88.
101
See supra note 87.
102
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940) (holding that no class member can be
bound to a judgment in which that person was not adequately represented); see also Laskey
v. Int’l Union, 638 F.2d 954, 956 (6th Cir. 1981) (explaining that “[a] judgment in a class
action binds the class where the class [has] been adequately represented or where they
actually participated in the litigation. An absent member will not be bound if he proves the
procedure did not adequately insure the protection of his interests”); accord Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 721 (2005)
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representatives for the class must have virtually the same interest in the
litigation as all the absent class members who will be bound by the
litigation.103 The class representatives should so closely align with the
absent class members’ interests in the litigation that the representatives
“may be depended upon to bring forward the entire merits of the
controversy as protection to their own interests.”104 Indeed, adequate
representation is the touchstone of due process in class action cases,
providing the constitutional equivalent of the absent class members’
“day in court.”105
The seminal case of Hansberry v. Lee106 focused on an agreement
restricting the use of land in a Chicago neighborhood, which dictated
that no part of the land in that neighborhood could be “sold, leased to or
(describing the tension inherent in the use of preclusion as applied to members of a class,
and the doctrine of preclusion as it developed through its use in individual litigation,
stemming from the multiplicity of interests represented in a class action). Wolff asserts:
There is a deep tension between the doctrine of preclusion as it is
frequently applied in individual litigation and the conditions that
serve to limit the use of the class action device. When absent class
members are bound to a judgment, they are bound by virtue of the
commonality of interest that makes it possible to find individual
plaintiffs who will serve as proper representatives for them all. A
court’s evaluation of factors like adequacy of representation, typicality, and
superiority requires it to compare the respective interests and incentives of all
the members of the class. When a court conducts such an evaluation, it
must do so not only with respect to the likely course of the litigation
currently before it, but also with respect to the likely future impact of a
judgment upon the interests of class members. In other words, a court
must assess, early in the proceedings, what the likely preclusive effect
of a judgment will be upon members of the class it has been asked to
certify.
Id. at 721-22 (emphasis added).
103
See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 671 (2005); Underwood, supra note 75. The idea of
adequate class representation must be more than a “convenient fiction.” Underwood, supra
note 75, at 788-89. But see Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 981 (5th
Cir. 1996) (examining the possible intraclass interest conflicts between those plaintiffs who
were currently exhibiting asbestos-related injuries and thus requiring monetary settlements
right away, and those plaintiffs whose asbestos-related injuries were not yet observable
and may not create symptoms for many years, thus rendering an incentive for some delay
in disbursing the monetary damages). The Flangan court did not attempt to resolve the
intraclass interest conflicts, but rather determined that they were simply “outweighed” by
the groups’ common interest in a Global Settlement Agreement. Id.
104
AM. JUR. 2D Judgments, supra note 103, § 671; see also Rittenoure v. Edinburg, 159 F.2d
989, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1947) (“The principles of class representation whereby absent persons
may be bound by judgments contemplate a real presentation of the issues to the court by
parties whose interests are identical with those of the absent persons, and a decision of
them by [a] court.”).
105
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45-46.
106
Id.
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permitted to be occupied by any person of the colored race.”107 The
Hansberry family acquired land in that neighborhood and, as AfricanAmericans, challenged the validity of the restrictive covenant on the
grounds that the requisite percentage of landowners had not signed the
agreement.108 In an earlier case, referred to by the Court as the Burke
case, a landowner brought suit to enforce the same restrictive agreement
that would later be challenged in Hansberry.109 In the Burke case, the
parties stipulated that the required percentage of landowners had signed
the agreement, rendering the agreement valid.110 However, the circuit
court found in Hansberry’s action that only 54% of landowners signed
the agreement, and that the stipulation from the Burke case was false and
fraudulent.111 Nonetheless, the circuit court held that Hansberry was
bound through res judicata to the earlier agreement, which bound all
landowners in that Chicago neighborhood as class members in Burke.112
The Hansberry situation prompted the Supreme Court to declare that
no party can be joined to a class judgment merely because that party
superficially fits the description of the purported class to be bound.113
Hansberry was a landowner in that neighborhood, and by that
description, within the class of persons allegedly bound by the Burke
case.114 However, the Court noted that while the plaintiffs in the Burke
case sought to enforce the restrictive agreement, the plaintiffs in the
Id. at 37-38.
Id. The Hansberrys, as petitioners, challenged the restrictive agreement on the
grounds that it never became valid because it was not signed by the requisite 95% of the
frontage landowners. Id.
109
See Burke v. Kleinman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
110
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
111
Id.
112
Id. A claim may be barred by a judgment in an earlier suit through the doctrine of res
judicata. See AM. JUR. 2D Judgments, supra note 103, § 514. In order to bar a claim through
this doctrine, the party seeking to bar the claim must demonstrate that the prior case has
come to a judgment that is final, valid, and decided on the merits of the case (as opposed to
being dismissed for some procedural deficiency). Id. Further, the parties in the later suit
must either be the same as the parties from the first suit, or must be in privity with, a
successor in interest to, or adequately represented by, the parties from the first suit. Id.
Finally, the claim to be barred must be within the scope of those claims adjudged in the
first suit; that is, the claim to be barred must stem from the same transaction or set of
transactions as the first claim. Id. See also Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U.S. 252 (1893);
Popp v. Hardy, 508 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“Before res judicata operates to
bar a subsequent action, it must be shown: (1) that the former court had jurisdiction; (2)
that the matter now in issue was or might have been determined in the prior suit; (3) that
the former controversy was between the same parties or their privies; and (4) that the prior
judgment was entered on the merits.”).
113
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44-46.
114
Id. at 38.
107
108
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Hansberry case sought to prove its invalidity, rendering the Hansberry
plaintiffs’ interests in direct opposition to the interests asserted in the
Burke case.115 The Court held that it is a violation of the absent class
members’ due process rights to bind them to a judgment in which the
substantial interest of their purported representatives “are not
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed
to represent.”116 Thus, the federal Constitution forbids the foreclosure of
absent class members’ rights absent adequate representation.117
Moreover, adequacy of representation is vitally important because
class actions brought under Rule 23 may result in binding judgments
upon class members who never had any actual knowledge of the suit,
and whose due process rights depend entirely upon the representatives
certified by the court.118 Because of the high stakes in class actions,
including the binding effect on absent class members and their
constitutional concerns, the adequacy requirement is generally strictly
construed, carefully scrutinized, and stringently applied.119 Courts must
consider the putative class representative while keeping in mind that the
“fair representation cannot be inferred merely from vigorous

Id. at 45-46 (reasoning that “[t]he plaintiffs in the Burke Case sought to compel
performance of the agreement in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. . . .
In seeking to enforce the agreement the plaintiffs in that suit were not representing the
petitioners here whose substantial interest is in resisting performance”).
116
Id. (“For a court in this situation to ascribe to either the plaintiffs or defendants the
performance of such functions on behalf of petitioners here, is to attribute to them a power
that it cannot be said that they had assumed to exercise, and a responsibility which, in view
of their dual interests it does not appear that they could rightly discharge.”). The Court
also noted that allowing parties whose interests were not the same as the absent class
members to be representatives of the class would afford opportunities for “fraudulent and
collusive sacrifice of the rights of absent parties.” Id. at 45. See also Underwood, supra note
75, at 788-89 (listing a variety of requirements courts had given for putative class
representatives to be deemed adequate, including having a keen interest in the progress
and outcome of the litigation, having some knowledge of the class claims and class action
procedures, being in sufficiently good health to vigorously prosecute the action, being a
reliable witness, being able and willing to bear the costs of the litigation, and not insisting
on more than a pro rata share of any recovery).
117
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44-46.
118
Du Pont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 621 (D. Del. 1973). Indeed, the representatives must
be expected to “put up a real fight” on behalf of themselves or their named clients, as well
the absent class members. Id. (internal citations omitted). See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement
Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2004) (noting the detrimental effect on the finality of
class action suits where adequacy is not properly evaluated and established, opening the
door to collateral attacks from absent class members based on inadequate representation).
119
Rutledge v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1975); Thompson v. T.
F. I. Cos., 64 F.R.D. 140, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
115
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representation.”120 Because of its powerful binding effect on the class,
the class action device may not be used simply for the personal purposes
of the named plaintiff, no matter how vigorously the named plaintiff
might pursue those interests.121 Vigorous pursuit of personal interests
“would inevitably compromise [the named plaintiffs’] duty to seek and
obtain for the absent class members the most favorable resolution of [the]
dispute.”122
Further, courts must separately scrutinize the counsel representing
the class. Because class counsel has a duty to serve the interests of the
named client and the absent class members, a recent amendment to Rule
23 spells out the process a court must use to evaluate class counsel.123 In

120
Martinez v. Barasch, No. 01-2289, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11019, at *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2004).
121
Id. at *14.
122
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
123
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g):
(g) Class Counsel.
(1) Appointing Class Counsel.
(A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that
certifies a class must appoint class counsel.
(B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class.
(C) In appointing class counsel, the court
(i) must consider:
the work counsel has done in identifying or
investigating potential claims in the action,
counsel’s experience in handling class
actions, other complex litigation, and claims
of the type asserted in the action,
counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law,
and
the resources counsel will commit to
representing the class;
(ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to
counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the class;
(iii) may direct potential class counsel to provide
information on any subject pertinent to the
appointment and to propose terms for attorney
fees and nontaxable costs; and
(iv) may make further orders in connection with the
appointment.
(2) Appointment Procedure.
(A) The court may designate interim counsel to act on
behalf of the putative class before determining whether
to certify the action as a class action.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/6

Bracke: Where Improper Purposes Lead, Inadequate Protections Follow: Int

2006]

Integrating Rule 11 with Rule 23

377

making this inquiry, a court may consider a wide range of factors,
including the attorney’s interests, competence, experience with similar
class actions, and professional integrity.124 Class counsel must be
(B) When there is one applicant for appointment as class
counsel, the court may appoint that applicant only if
the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)(B) and
(C). If more than one adequate applicant seeks
appointment as class counsel, the court must appoint
the applicant best able to represent the interests of the
class.
(C) The order appointing class counsel may include
provisions about the award of attorney fees or
nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h).
Id.; see also supra note 84. While the guidelines espoused in Rule 23(g) were new in the 2003
amendment to Rule 23, the concept of evaluating the adequacy of class counsel is not new
at all. In fact, prior to the 2003 amendment that created subsection (g), the Rule 23(a)(4)
adequacy requirement was viewed as encompassing three separate but overlapping
elements: “(1) the chosen class representative cannot have antagonistic or conflicting
claims with other members of class, (2) the named representative must have ‘a sufficient
interest in outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy,’ and (3) counsel for the named plaintiff must
be competent, experienced, qualified, and generally able to conduct proposed litigation vigorously.”
Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 170 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Ill. 1997) (emphasis added). The
amendment gave courts specified guidelines to use in evaluating class counsel, but the
concerns addressed by those guidelines have been part of courts’ considerations under
Rule 23(a)(4) even before such specific guidelines existed. Gill v. Monroe County Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 92 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (declaring it the duty of the class representative
to select, actively supervise, and question the class attorney to ensure the counsel is
“capable of competently prosecuting the proposed lawsuit”). Indeed, the unique aspects of
a class counsel’s relationship to the class members has been considered for many years
prior to the creation and implementation of Rule 23’s subsection (g). Cullen v. N.Y. State
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that “by granting class
status, the court places the attorney for the named parties in a position of public trust and
responsibility, and in effect creates an attorney-client relationship between the absentee
members and the attorney”); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS 21 (6th ed. 2002) (observing the original notions of client-attorney
relationships, which must by necessity be greatly altered when an entire class of plaintiffs
is represented). Gillers quoted Lord Brougham’s statement that “‘an advocate, in the
discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client’”
GILLERS, supra, at 21 (citing 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)).
124
See Underwood, supra note 75, at 790. It is not imperative in the context of individual
litigation for the courts to scrutinize the litigants’ chosen counsel in this same manner
because, unlike absent class members, the individual litigant assumes the risk of choosing
his own attorney and participating in his own lawsuit in a way that absent class members,
essentially by definition, cannot. See also Wolff, supra note 102, at 721.
Just as an individual litigant in a civil proceeding does not enjoy any
right of adequate representation that could enable him to escape the
effects of a judgment, and hence assumes the risk that his lawyers will
make bad litigation choices on his behalf, so a litigant assumes the risk
that the judgment that results from a lawsuit may compromise other
important interests that he possesses. We trust individual litigants to
make the necessary choices in navigating these risks. When litigants

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 6

378

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

qualified, experienced, and “generally able to conduct the litigation,”
and courts are free to consider any prior instance where the putative
class counsel failed to proceed in the best interests of the class.125
Because the class counsel plays such a pivotal role in class action
litigation, any personal interests in the litigation may become suspect
and render an attorney improper to represent the class as its legal
counsel.126
Thus, overlap exists between Rule 11’s prohibition on filing papers
with improper motive and Rule 23’s requirement of adequate
representation. A putative class representative whose interest in the
litigation is rooted in improper motives would not have virtually the
same interest in the litigation as all the absent class members whose
motives are proper and rooted in the resolution of legal issues being
asserted.127 Depriving the absent class members of a representative
whose motivation is the resolution of those legal issues would deprive
them of an advocate who could “be depended upon to bring forward the
entire merits of the controversy as protection to their own interests”
because, after all, the representative would be seeking to protect a
different set of interests than the absent class members.128 This is true
regardless of how enthusiastically and vigorously the putative
representative with improper motives might present his or her matter
make bad choices, or when they fail to consider the preclusive
consequences of a lawsuit at all, we consider it an appropriate
expression of litigant autonomy to bind them to the result.
Id.
Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Serv., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 258 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973, 977 (D.D.C. 1977) (noting that
because the putative class counsel fit into the class he sought to represent, a risk existed
that he could be accused of providing inadequate representation in return for personal
benefit, and that his interests as a class member could lead to more vigorous representation
of those class interests that most closely aligned with his own interests, rather than
adequately representing all class interests); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D.
549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that the class action device makes feasible small suits that
would otherwise be infeasible, thereby encouraging litigation, which in turn invites the
solicitation of litigation, offering class counsel legal fees that far outweigh the expected
recovery for the class members and thus stimulating personal interests in the class counsel
that may not be completely antagonistic to the class members, but that also do not simply
represent the interests of the class members). Accord Goland, supra note 28, at 449 (noting
that it is, in practice, the advocates for the parties rather than the parties themselves who
become primarily responsible for conducting the litigation, as it is the counsel that selects
the legal theories pursued, develops the evidence, conducts discovery, and tries the case).
127
See supra note 102 and text accompanying note 103. For a brief illustration of the
problem with having absent class members being represented by differently-motivated
class representatives, see infra text accompanying note 157.
128
See supra notes 104, 122 and accompanying text.
125
126
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before the court.129 Likewise, and perhaps even more troubling, an
attorney seeking to represent a class who is driven by personal interests
and improper motives is “suspect” in the court’s scrutiny, because the
counsel should proceed in the best interest of the entire class.130 The
intersection of Rule 11’s improper motive prohibitions with Rule 23’s
protections for class members is more than mere academic conjecture.
Recent congressional action acknowledged class actions as an
increasingly prevalent form of litigation and recognized the manifold
dangers inherent in class action litigation when the concerns at the
intersection of Rule 11 and Rule 23 are not sufficiently addressed.131
C. Following the Compass at the Fork in the Path: Where Rule 11 and Rule
23(a) Meet
When Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”), it presented a series of findings acknowledging the increasing
prevalence of class actions in the legal arena, and some of the concerns
inherent in the use of such actions.132 While Congress called class actions
“an important and valuable part of the legal system,” it also found that
there had been abuses of the class action device that undermined public
respect for the judicial system and harmed not only class members with
legitimate claims, but also defendants who had acted “responsibly.”133
Further, Congress stated that the purposes of CAFA included assuring
fair and prompt recoveries for class members asserting legitimate claims,
allowing federalization of “interstate cases of national importance,” and
benefiting society as a whole with lowered consumer prices.134
Thus, Congress painted with broad strokes the base layer for further
inquiry into the overlapping territories of Rule 11 and Rule 23(a). While
never explicitly referring to the “improper motives” described by Rule
11, Congress expressed in CAFA the view that attorneys often have
strong personal incentives attached to class actions because of the
windfall legal fees they stand to reap, perhaps even above and beyond
any incentives relating to actual representation of the class members’
interests.135 Congress also opened the door for further inquiry into
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
131
See infra Part II.C.
132
See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); Rick Knight, The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005: A Perspective, FED. LAW., June 2005, at 47-48.
133
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(1)-(2), 119 Stat. 4-5 (2005).
134
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 5.
135
See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4 (finding that “[c]lass members often receive
little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where . . . counsel
129
130
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motives by including in its findings the idea that responsible defendants
are being harmed through abuses of the class action device.136
Therefore, especially in light of the recent passage of CAFA, plaintiff
and defense bars alike are presented with the query: Where do Rule 11’s
mandates regarding proper motives and the varying circuit courts’
interpretations of that Rule coincide with Rule 23(a)’s mandates of
adequate representation for all class members and concerns regarding
class counsel’s potential personal interests?
III. ANALYSIS: LEARNING TO READ THE ROADMAP
For nearly seventy years, the American bar and judiciary have
struggled to interpret, use, and follow Rule 11.137 Courts have dealt in
varying ways with the Rule’s requirement that papers be filed without
improper motive, alternately deciding to read the Rule’s text literally, to
disregard it, or use it only in those instances where the first prong of
Rule 11 (frivolous filings) is also affected.138 These decisions have
created a crossroads in federal jurisprudence, and the increasing use of
class actions as a litigation device, as well as CAFA’s push toward
federalizing the bulk of class actions, demands that some uniform
method be established to handle Rule 11’s improper motive prong
relative to class actions.139 It is time to choose, at the junction of these
are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little
or no value”). See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
The court in Kamilewicz called “questionable” a state court’s finding that attorney fees in a
class action suit were reasonable where the class members each recovered less than $10, but
were forced to pay the class counsel nearly $100 in fees. Id. at 511. However, the circuit
court affirmed the district court’s determination that it was barred from reconsidering the
state court’s decision by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which declares that the lower
federal courts are not to be used for appellate review of state court decisions. Id. at 509,
511. Thus, the class action plaintiffs were left with a positive recovery on the court records,
but a negative value to their bank accounts in reality. Id. at 511. See also Roger Parloff,
Coughing It Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, § 7, at 17 (reviewing a book, Civil Warriors: The
Legal Siege on the Tobacco Industry by Dan Zegart, and noting the instance of a lawsuit led by
a small law firm attorney, Ron Motley, who stood to earn more than one billion dollars in
legal fees for his role as class action attorney in the action against the tobacco industry);
Monica Roman, A Blockbuster of a Legal Bill, BUS. WEEK, June 14, 2001, at 46 (observing that
despite a legal victory for the class action plaintiffs in a suit against “video rental giant”
Blockbuster, the “real winners” were the class attorneys who were awarded $9.25 million
in fees, whereas the class members were awarded coupons for video rentals).
136
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 4.
137
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
138
See supra Part II.A (examining the majority interpretation of Rule 11’s improper
motive prong); supra Part II.B (explaining the minority interpretation and use of Rule 11).
139
See generally supra Part II.C (giving a brief summary of CAFA and Congress’ related
concerns about class actions).
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crossroads, which direction will be pursued and developed, and which
will be relegated to jurisprudential history.
Accordingly, this Part will examine two options for approaching the
improper motive analysis demanded by Rule 11 in the realm of federal
class actions. Part III.A of this section begins with a discussion of why
the refusal to acknowledge an overlap between Rule 11’s improper
motive prong and the concerns embedded in Rule 23’s class action
requirements creates instability and uncertainty in federal
jurisprudence.140 Next, Part III.B explores the implications for class
action filings using the Ninth Circuit’s determination that non-frivolous
claims cannot violate Rule 11’s improper motive prong.141 This Part will
demonstrate that such a reading, especially as applied to class actions,
eviscerates the two-prong structure of Rule 11 and decimates the spirit of
Rule 23’s typicality and adequate representation requirements.142
Finally, Part III.C of this section examines the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of Rule 11’s improper motive prong, and how such an
interpretation most closely comports with the Rule 23 requirements of
typicality and adequate representation, as well as most effectively
provides an answer to Congress’ concerns voiced in CAFA’s findings.143
A. Separated Means Complicated: An Example of Confusion To Come
As the situation currently stands, the court in which a complaint is
filed may make the difference between whether the party filing that
complaint receives sanctions, and whether that action is allowed to
proceed without interruption. A complaint that may, for instance, be
seen as inherently nonviolative of the improper motive prong in the
Ninth Circuit may result in sanctioning by the Seventh Circuit. 144 While
this schism between circuits may be problematic on its own, it is further
complicated when the complaint in question relates to a class action,
which may well extend beyond state or circuit boundaries,
encompassing large numbers of class members.145

Infra Part III.A.
See supra notes 31, 41, and accompanying text.
142
Infra Part III.B.
143
Infra Part III.C.
144
See supra text accompanying note 18 (observing the schism between the circuits
relative to Rule 11 interpretation); supra note 25 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit—the
majority—position); supra note 59 (describing the Seventh Circuit—the minority—
position).
145
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 820 (1999) (calling the number of
individual cases being pending in federal courts “elephantine” and thus requiring class
140
141
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Thus, envision a hypothetical situation in which a class action
complaint is filed in the Ninth Circuit: plaintiffs file a complaint against
a large corporation, alleging sex discrimination, filed with the
underlying and central purpose of economically damaging the
defendant corporation.146 This Note shall refer to these as the “ulterior
motive-focused” plaintiffs or parties. Their complaint would be allowed
to proceed in the Ninth Circuit despite its arguably improper purpose
because it is non-frivolous.147 This class includes plaintiffs from across
the nation, and thus encompasses class members whose central purpose
and interest in the action is the vigorous pursuit of the issue of sex
discrimination in the defendant corporation. This Note shall refer to
these as “issue-focused” plaintiffs, who may or may not agree with the
purpose of economically damaging or embarrassing the defendant
corporation, but at the very least, do not consider that purpose central to
their lawsuit.148

action treatment); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (observing the
parties included in the proposed class definition numbered into the hundreds of thousands
and perhaps into the millions); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir.
2004) (describing the lawsuit where each plaintiff had a relatively small claim, but where
such a large number of plaintiffs existed that it rendered a sizeable liability to the
defendant, the “ultimate negative value class action lawsuit”). A negative value suit is one
where class members’ claims could not be economically litigated individually, but may be
brought as a class action to achieve a recovery that would otherwise be barred by economic
concerns. See Monumental, 365 F.3d at 412 n.1; see also Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 809 (1985).
146
This example is a fictional case, based very loosely on the structure of a real-life class
action lawsuit. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
However, while the Dukes case provided a starting point for the fictional example used in
this Note, this is not meant to suggest or imply that the Dukes plaintiffs had any improper
motive. Their case has been greatly fictionalized and is used for illustration purposes only.
147
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit (as generally joined by
the Second and Fifth Circuits) contends that a determination of frivolousness is necessary
to justify a finding of improper purpose, and that if a paper is not proven to be frivolous,
then any subjective reasons for its filing are irrelevant. See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56
F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1995); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362
(9th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit adheres to a test slightly more flexible than the Ninth
Circuit’s, permitting a finding of improper purpose where “unusual circumstances” exist.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. However, the Fifth Circuit is still properly
grouped with the Ninth Circuit despite this apparent “loophole” in its Rule 11
jurisprudence because, as of 2003, only once had the Fifth Circuit court deemed any
circumstances in a case “unusual” enough to warrant sanctions for improper purpose. See
text accompanying notes 46-51.
148
See supra text accompanying note 68. The Seventh Circuit (as joined by the Fourth
Circuit in its Kunstler opinion) demands that even if litigants undertake a lawsuit with
mixed motives, as is often the case, the purpose of litigating and vindicating the legal issues
asserted in the complaint be central and sincere in order to pass muster under the Rule 11
improper motive prong. See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Seventh Circuit jurisprudence would indicate that the complaint
filed for the purpose of publicly embarrassing and economically harming
the defendant corporation should be sanctioned as having an improper
purpose under Rule 11, but that the complaint filed for the purpose of
litigating the sex discrimination issue be permitted to proceed.149 The
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence produces an entirely different result, not
only allowing the former complaint to proceed, but locking into its
definition of a “class” all those members whose central purpose in the
lawsuit is litigating the legal issue.150
As the case example illustrates, the circuit split in Rule 11
interpretation will breed confusion, uncertainty, unfairness, and
inconsistency in federal class actions. If the complaint in the example
were read under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence and thus allowed to
proceed unsanctioned, all the issue-focused class members caught up in
the class definition would be “represented” by ulterior-motive focused
plaintiffs whose interests in the litigation were not “typical” by Rule 23’s
required standards.151 The rights and recoveries of those issue-focused
class members in the lawsuit would be guided and ultimately
determined by advocates whose primary focus and central purpose in
the action would be to harm and embarrass the defendant.152 While
harming and embarrassing the defendant may also produce some
recovery for the issue-focused class members, their rights and the merits
See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit asserts that a
facially non-frivolous legal claim is not enough to survive Rule 11 scrutiny. Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987). The reason for filing or
pursuing the claim must be considered as well, and where that reason is for an improper
purpose, it is irrelevant that the claim may also state a non-frivolous issue; it is still
sanctionable. Id.
150
See supra note 41 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s Westlake North holding that no nonfrivolous papers can violate Rule 11, no matter what “purposes” prompted their filing);
supra note 80 (discussing the requirement that class be definable, and the difference
between an injury-related state of mind inquiry, and an improper-purpose related state of
mind inquiry).
151
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining the typicality requirement of
Rule 23).
152
See supra notes 88-89 (noting that while some factual variation may exist between the
claims of the putative representatives and the absent class members, the interests of both
sets of parties must be so coextensive that the absent members are assured that no part of
their claim will be unrepresented or underrepresented by the named plaintiffs); see also
Underwood, supra note 75 at 817-18 (noting the characterization of some class action
litigation as “legalized blackmail”); supra note 61 (discussing various criticisms of the legal
profession spurred by the growing public awareness of and displeasure with “predatory
litigation”); supra text accompanying note 133 (noting Congress’ concerns expressed in
CAFA’s findings regarding the harm to responsible defendants caused by some class action
litigation).
149
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of their claims would clearly not be presented with the vigor, focus, and
emphasis afforded by Rule 23’s requirements of typicality and adequate
representation.153
This situation will not only encourage class action forum shopping
among the federal circuits, but it will also render the judgments and
settlements in those actions subject to reopening, thereby leaving the
suits with tenuous finality, at best.154 In the case example above, the
class members whose central purpose focused on the legal issue rather
than on potential harm to the defendant could collaterally attack any
judgment or settlement produced in the action on the basis of inadequate
representation.155 Pursuant to Rule 23’s protections of typicality and
adequate representation, the ulterior-motive focused plaintiffs (whose
central purpose clearly differed from that of the issue-focused plaintiffs)
were not actually adequate representatives for the entire class.156

153
See supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (assessing the overlap of Rule 11 motive
concerns with the protections afforded by Rule 23’s typicality prong); supra text
accompanying notes 127-30 (examining the interplay between Rule 11 motive concerns and
the protections afforded to absent class members by Rule 23’s adequate representation
prong).
154
See Mullenix, supra note 118, at 1691 (describing the possibility of collateral attacks
based on inadequate representation as “the singlemost threatening challenge for the
resolution of aggregate disputes through the class action mechanism”). Mullenix asserts
that courts, plaintiffs, and counsel alike, do a poor job of protecting the absent class
members through a thorough determination of adequate representation at the front-end of
the class action suits. Id. See accord John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373
(2000) (noting the Supreme Court’s warning that its view of the theory of adequate
representation is yet embryonic, and may develop into a “due process limitation upon the
ability of class counsel to resolve the legal rights of absent or non-consenting class
members”); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 571 (1997) (observing courts and commentators view of adequate representation
in the wake of Hansberry as being the “touchstone of due process,” over and above even an
individual opportunity to be heard). Thus, it is well-documented that a lawsuit’s finality is
significantly weakened when a class action is allowed to proceed with questionable
protection for the absent class members’ adequate representation rights.
155
See supra note 116 (discussing the Hansberry ruling and noting that deeming a class
representative “adequate” for Rule 23 purposes ascribes to them a power and
responsibility with regard to the absent class members’ rights that cannot be discharged if
the representative’s central purposes differ or conflict with those of the absent members).
156
See supra text accompanying notes 120-22 (explaining that vigorous pursuit of
purposes not central to and shared by the absent class members compromises the
representative’s duty to the absent class members to seek and obtain the most favorable
possible resolution of their dispute). The class action device is a particularly poor vehicle
for asserting personal purposes and interests, far more so than individual litigation,
because of the binding effect the action has on all absent class members. Martinez v.
Barasch, No. 01 2289, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11019, at *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2004). Even
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It is easy to see how this could lead to direct conflicts of interest
between the class members. For example, if the defendant corporation
were willing to settle quickly and quietly with changes to its corporate
infrastructure to better protect against sex discrimination, the named
plaintiffs would likely reject such an offer in favor of more public
litigation and media attention, whereas the issue-focused class members
would be deprived of an arguably ideal resolution to their issue.157 Such
a conflict of interests, as firmly established in Hansberry and its progeny,
is grounds for collaterally attacking whatever resolution is achieved in
the lawsuit.158
This example is fictional, but its structure is taken from an actual
lawsuit, and similarly structured suits appear on court dockets across
this country.159 This dilemma presents countless situations in which
ulterior-motive focused class members, whose complaint would be
sanctioned in some circuits but not in others, directly conflicts with the
interests of issue-focused members within the class.160 A class action
being pursued for ulterior motives, and arguably improper purposes,
thus creates an atmosphere of uncertainty among litigants and the
judiciary, because the finality of any judgment or settlement essentially
turns on: (1) whether other issue-focused class members never discover
that their rights were determined by parties whose purpose and interests
differed from their own; or (2) how the circuits finally resolve their
conflicted readings of Rule 11’s improper purpose prong, so that its
effect on typicality and adequate representation in class actions can
finally be standardized.

if the conflicts between motive-focused and issue-focused plaintiffs would be revealed by a
court’s thorough evaluation under the current Rule 23(a), there currently exists no uniform
method of judicial reasoning to ensure that those conflicts actually result in sanctioning or
denial of class certification. Especially in a circuit where the idea of “improper purpose” is
essentially negated by the existence of a non-frivolous claim, the danger is that the court
would declare representation adequate because all putative class members shared the same
non-frivolous claim, rather than denying certification because of the differences in
motivation. See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that improper purpose does not exist unless a filing is determined to be
frivolous).
157
See supra note 156.
158
See supra notes 118, 154.
159
Regarding the case on which the example is very loosely based, see supra note 146.
Regarding a few examples of large class actions, see cases cited supra note 145.
160
Regarding the difference in circuit court’s reactions to papers filed with arguably
improper purposes, see supra Part II.A. Regarding the prohibition on class representatives
having directly conflicting interests with the absent class members, see supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
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There are essentially two paths that may be followed at this
crossroads. The first would adopt the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Rule 11’s improper motive prong, essentially obliterating the current
dual-prong obligations imposed by Rule 11, and rendering issue-focused
class members stuck in ulterior motive-focused classes without remedy
or protection.161 The second path would adopt the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of Rule 11, reading it as the text and historical
development of the Rule implies, giving credence to both prongs of the
Rule and requiring that papers be filed without improper purpose.162
This path would lead to greater protections for the issue-focused class
members as intended by Rule 23 and, thus, greater finality in the
judgments and settlements produced in large class actions.163
B. Eviscerate and Decimate: The Perils of Adopting Ninth Circuit Rule 11
Jurisprudence
Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Rule 11 improper
purpose prong would, essentially, eviscerate the dual-prong structure of
Rule 11.164 Reading Rule 11’s improper purpose mandate as being
fulfilled whenever its “frivolous filings” mandate is met basically
condenses the Rule 11 inquiry into a one-step process, rather than two
separate steps as the text of the current Rule requires.165 The Ninth
Circuit itself has admitted in its opinions that its reading of Rule 11 does
not comport with the text of the rule.166 Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation, therefore, ignores the text of Rule 11 and ignores the dual
purposes the Rule was intended to serve.167

See infra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the minority position regarding Rule 11 asserted by
the Seventh Circuit).
163
See infra Part III.C.
164
See supra note 31 (highlighting the Ninth Circuit’s admission that its assertion that
Rule 11’s improper purpose prong is not independent from the frivolousness prong comes
“despite” the Rule’s text, rather than because of it). Cf. infra note 191 (explaining the
drafters’ apparent intent to preserve the dual prong structure of Rule 11).
165
See supra notes 31, 164; see also supra note 16 (explaining Rule 11 from inception to
present-day and presenting its text).
166
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (observing the Ninth Circuit’s admission that
its interpretation of Rule 11 comes not from the language of the Rule, but “despite” the
language of the Rule).
167
See Mazurczak, supra note 16, at 106 (noting that Rule 11’s improper purpose clause is
separate and independent from the frivolousness clause). Mazurczak asserts that the
second prong of Rule 11, the improper purpose clause, addresses the problem of abusing
the legal system in an attempt to pursue personal or economic harassment. Id. This clearly
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Rule, as an attempt to pursue personal or
161
162

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/6

Bracke: Where Improper Purposes Lead, Inadequate Protections Follow: Int

2006]

Integrating Rule 11 with Rule 23

387

Moreover, the evisceration of Rule 11’s dual-prong structure causes
acute harm when applied to class action litigation and would decimate
protections afforded absent class members under the typicality and
adequate representation requirements of Rule 23.168 First, ignoring the
dual prongs of Rule 11 would wreak havoc on the typicality requirement
of Rule 23 because typicality requires a court’s determination that the
class representatives share with the absent class members the degree of
importance and centrality assigned to the issues in the claim.169 If the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11 is adopted uniformly, then any
colorable claim would automatically pass the Rule 11 test, simply
because it states a non-frivolous legal issue.170 However, it would create
a legal fiction in that the ulterior motive-focused plaintiffs could “pass
off” the claims and interests of the issue-focused plaintiffs as their own,
simply because each group would be able to file facially identical
complaints.171
Even assuming that all the plaintiffs—ulterior motive-focused and
issue-focused alike—suffered injury in the same general fashion, the
Rule 23 typicality requirement is ill-served by glossing over the Rule 11
motive concerns.172 The general similarities in injury suffered would
permit each group of plaintiffs to file facially similar complaints and pass
the Ninth Circuit’s Rule 11 test.173 However, the arguments and
assertions of the ulterior motive-focused plaintiffs can hardly be said to
vigorously, fairly, and thoroughly encompass the arguments and
assertions of issue-focused plaintiffs, precisely because the ulterior
motive-focused plaintiffs will have different incentives in the action than
the issue-focused plaintiffs.174

economic harassment would still pass its Rule 11 muster so long as the filing was nonfrivolous. See supra note 147.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (examining the overlap and interplay of
Rule 11’s improper purpose concerns and Rule 23’s typicality requirement); text
accompanying notes 127-30 (explaining the overlap and interplay of Rule 11’s improper
purpose concerns and Rule 23’s adequate representation requirement).
169
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
170
See supra note 147.
171
See supra text accompanying note 113 (noting that a party is not properly joined to a
class action merely because he appears to superficially fit into the class).
172
See supra text accompanying note 91.
173
See supra note 147 (stating that a colorable claim alone is sufficient under Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence to pass Rule 11 scrutiny, despite any differences in motive or purpose).
174
See supra text accompanying notes 83, 91-92. It is, perhaps, disconcerting to note that
in practice, the enforcement of typicality and adequate representation comes primarily
through challenges from the defendant facing a class action lawsuit. Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
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Thus, stripping Rule 11 of its independent prongs and dual concerns
in turn robs class members of a vital element in their typicality
protection. The typicality prong of Rule 23 is intended to protect class
members from unnecessarily involving their legal rights in an action
when the class representatives have different stakes or incentives in the
action, or where the representatives would not ensure that all significant
aspects of all class members’ claims are vigorously and adequately
asserted.175 If courts assume that a class representative may properly
proceed with a claim simply because the claim asserts a non-frivolous
legal issue, without also determining whether the purpose of the claim is
actually the assertion of that legal issue, all other class members face the
involvement of their rights in a litigation pursued by a representative
who may well have varying—or outright conflicting, as the case example
above illustrates—interests.176 This flies in the face of Rule 23’s intended
protection under the typicality prong.177

Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 63 (1991). Naturally,
this results in the absent class members’ protection depending upon the challenges brought
by a party whose interests and objectives are likely diametrically opposed to that of the
plaintiffs. Id. The defendant challenging the class action will argue that the class should
not be certified because the putative representatives are not sufficiently typical of the class
and do not provide adequate representation for the absent class members, thus presenting
arguments colored with the very concerns the absent class members themselves might feel.
Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1974); Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc.,
388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (observing that “defendants, who naturally have no
interest in the successful prosecution of the class suit against them, are called upon to
interpose arguments in opposition to class determination motions verbally grounded upon
a concern for the best representation for the class while the implicit, but nonetheless real,
objective of their vigorous legal assaults is to insure no representation for the class”)
(internal quotations omitted). This further supports the notion that purposes of the named
plaintiffs must be examined and considered as part of the Rule 23 requirements, because
other than the court’s scrutiny, the absent class members are left to rely generally upon
their opponent’s challenges and arguments regarding their “best representation” to enforce
their Rule 23 protections. Umbriac, 388 F. Supp. at 275; Macey & Miller, supra note 174, at
63.
175
See supra notes 87-88.
176
See supra text accompanying notes 146-48 (establishing the case example). Regarding
the class representatives’ duties to the absent class members, see supra note 156.
177
See supra text accompanying notes 91-92; see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL
GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 251 (1987). Yeazell argues that typicality
and adequate representation are essentially inextricably bound up with one another:
“Typicality appears to be a means to the end of adequate representation, while adequate
representation of interests appears to be the end itself.” Id. Yeazell’s argument is
supported by other scholars who observe that the determination of adequate
representation often merges with typicality, and typicality acts as a checkpoint for making
sure the absent members are adequately protected by their class representatives. See, e.g.,
Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the
Corporate Level, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1163 (1999). Based upon Yeazell’s and Boyd’s
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Moreover, the protection afforded class members by Rule 23’s
adequate representation requirement will be similarly decimated upon
adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11.178 Adequate
representation requires that class representatives have virtually identical
interests in the litigation as all class members are bound to the
litigation’s result, but it quickly becomes clear that ulterior motivefocused litigants will likely have starkly different interests in the
litigation from their issue-focused counterparts.179 When absent class
members’ rights depend upon a representative vigorously asserting the
entire merits of the controversy, whether that representative is driven to
protect the same interests in the matter as the absent members must be a
foremost concern.180
Under the Ninth Circuit’s Rule 11 interpretation, class
representatives filing a non-frivolous claim cannot be said to have an
improper purpose.181 Unfortunately for the issue-focused class members
represented by an ulterior motive-focused plaintiff, though, that
interpretation falls far short of protecting the issue-focused members
given that a motive-focused representative has starkly different interests
from those of the absent members and cannot be trusted to fully and
zealously advocate the real issues in controversy.182 This directly
assertions, typicality is likely interconnected enough with adequate representation that a
questionable determination of typicality as would result from ignoring the Rule 11
improper purpose prong would actually cast doubt upon the determination of adequate
representation.
178
See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (setting forth the basic principles embodied
by the adequate representation requirement).
179
Regarding the necessity of virtually identical interests between class representatives
and absent class members, see supra note 103 and accompanying text. For the case example
illustrating a conflict of interest between the issue-focused plaintiffs and the ulterior
motive-focused plaintiffs, see supra note 156 and text accompanying note 157.
180
See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also supra note 174 (explaining that after
the court’s required determination of Rule 23 prerequisites, the absent class members’
enforcement of Rule 23 protections usually depends upon the defendant opposing the class
action).
181
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
182
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring class representatives to “fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class”); supra note 104 and accompanying text. The dangers to
absent class members engendered by conflicts in purpose between them and the named
plaintiffs are not unique to just the parties in the suit. This Note focuses on the conflicts
between class members, but it must be noted that the motive of the class counsel must be
examined as well, as examples of those interest conflicts are easily created and are just as
potentially damaging to the class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g); supra note 123
(discussing Rule 23(g)); supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (examining the
importance of a class counsel who lacks “improper motive” to absent class members). See
also Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003). Redish emphasizes
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conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hansberry, in which the
Court asserted that superficial fit in a class description is not alone
sufficient to bind the purported class members.183
The Ninth Circuit’s Rule 11 interpretation, as applied to class actions,
supports the direct opposite result from Hansberry: the superficial class
that the general public is affected by this situation too, because substantive law may be
affected through a class action pursued by a “bounty hunter” attorney, when that litigation
is pursued for purposes other than vindication of the class member’s rights and claims:
[A]ll too often the [class action] device permits the transformation of
the remedial enforcement model expressly adopted in the underlying
substantive law from a victim’s damage award structure into an
entirely distinct form not contemplated in the underlying substantive
law. In such cases, the suits are not, in any realistic sense, brought
either by or on behalf of the class members. The class members neither
make the decision to sue at the outset nor receive meaningful
compensation at the end. Instead, in these suits, as a practical matter, it
is the private attorneys who initiate suit and who are the only ones
rewarded for exposing the defendants’ law violations. In effect, the
promise of substantial attorneys’ fees provides the class lawyers with a
private economic incentive to discover violations of existing legal
restrictions on corporate behavior. Thus, what purports to be a class
action, brought primarily to enforce private individuals’ substantive
rights to compensatory relief, in reality amounts to little more than
private attorneys acting as bounty hunters, protecting the public
interest by enforcing the public policies embodied in controlling
statutes.
Id. at 77. Redish refers to these lawsuits as “faux” class actions. Id. Moreover, returning to
the focus on the conflicts of purpose and interest between class members, Redish notes that
class members motivated by those purposes the Seventh Circuit would call improper under
Rule 11 may actually be constitutionally improper in pursuing the litigation:
Would-be plaintiffs who are motivated exclusively by altruistic or ideological
concerns may not, as a constitutional matter, invoke the federal judicial
process. Unless the plaintiff has suffered some form of personal injury
traceable to the defendant’s violation of law and remediable by judicial
action, she constitutionally lacks the standing necessary to invoke the
federal courts’ jurisdiction. It surely does not follow, however, that
federal adjudication is incapable of advancing social, economic, or
political interests that extend well beyond the personal interest of the
individual litigant. It means, simply, that whatever impact federal
adjudication may have on the public interest must come as an incident
to the assertion and adjudication of narrower, personal interests.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). Redish’s assertions give further weight to the plight of the
issue-focused absent class member who faces being bound to the result of a litigation
pursued by class representatives or class counsel motivated by personal economic
incentives, or even by “altruistic” and “ideological” purposes.
183
See supra text accompanying note 113. The inherent dangers of conflict between class
members in class action lawsuits have been recognized by courts. See, e.g., Mendoza v.
United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980); In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’shps Litig., 171
F.R.D. 104, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Potential conflict between class members is often a danger
in large class actions.”).
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description—all class members who can assert as a non-frivolous claim
the issues presented in the complaint—would determine whether the
claim could progress.184 Because the Rule 11 motive inquiry is subsumed
by the non-frivolous inquiry, the superficial fit of a putative class
representative into a class description would suffice, as further inquiry
into the purpose behind the claim would be deemed inappropriate so
long as the claim was not frivolous.185 Clearly, this interpretation of Rule
11 as applied to class actions not only ignores the text of Rule 11, but
overlooks the mandate of the Supreme Court to bind only those class
members whose “substantial interest” is identical to that of the
representative parties.186
This is more than a mere academic concern: it is a violation of the
absent class members’ due process rights to be bound by a judgment in
which their only representation was by a party whose substantial
interest was most likely not the same as their own.187 The Supreme
Court realized the importance of the class representatives sharing the
same motive and purpose as the absent class members, noting that
ascribing the representatives the power to adjudicate the rights of others
who did not share their central purpose would provide opportunities for
fraud and collusion and ultimately the sacrifice of the absent class
members’ rights.188

See supra note 183.
See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 150-51, 157-58 (1982). The Court held that
Rule 23’s requirements of a class representative cannot be inferred simply because the
putative representative superficially fits the proposed class description, as conflicts
between the putative representative and other class members may still render that party an
inappropriate class representative, despite his fit into the suggested class description. Id. at
157-58. For further discussion of the Falcon case, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying
text. While Rule 23 gives courts the freedom to inquire further into the possible differences
between putative class representatives and the absent class members, it remains
problematic and troubling that such inquiry is nowhere made uniform, and each court’s
inquiry is likely to be shaped and strongly influenced by the individual circuit’s
interpretation of motives vis-à-vis non-frivolous claims. Supra note 156. As demonstrated
by the Hansberry case, the “possibility” of protection is not sufficient; only a guarantee of
truly adequate protection is constitutionally sufficient. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46
(1940); supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. Thus, the fact that some courts might, by
the freedom granted to them to inquire further under Rule 23, conclude that differences
between motive-focused plaintiffs and issue-focused plaintiffs warrant class certification
denial simultaneously demonstrates that some courts might not reach that conclusion,
thereby illustrating the need for a uniform solution to this quandary.
186
See supra text accompanying notes 113, 116; supra note 115.
187
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
188
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
184
185
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Therefore, the perils of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Rule 11 are severe and of immediate import, especially given the
pervasive use of class actions across the country. It is simply not enough
protection to claim ignorance to the underlying purpose behind a
putative representative’s claim when the rights of other class members
also hang in the balance.189 Evisceration of the dual prongs of Rule 11
and refusal to abide by its admonishment of improper purpose in filing
claims leads to nothing short of the decimation of the due process rights
currently protected by Rule 23’s typicality and adequate representation
requirements.190
C. Integrate and Reinvigorate: Protecting Rule 23’s Protections by Adopting
the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 11 Jurisprudence
Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11 and
integrating it with the Rule 23 considerations not only comports with the
text and spirit of each Rule, but reinvigorates the protections extended
by Rule 23’s typicality and adequate representation prongs. The text of
Rule 11 clearly mandates a consideration of two independent concerns,
and the amendments to the Rule since its inception in 1938 indicate a
continued adherence to the dual prong structure.191 The independence
of these prongs, and the need for separate consideration of improper
purpose, become even clearer when applied to federal class action
lawsuits.192
First, the dual prong structure more closely comports with the intent
of both the typicality and the adequate representation requirements of
Rule 23.193 Typicality requires the court to evaluate the purposes
prompting the putative representatives to bring the claim, as the court
See supra note 182.
See supra note 164.
191
See supra note 26. From its inception, Rule 11 has embodied two prongs, two
independent concerns. Mazurczak, supra note 16 at 106. When the Rule was amended in
1983, not only did the drafters see fit to retain the dual prong structure, but they enhanced
the improper motive prong by adding additional examples of improper purposes for which
sanctions would be appropriate. Id. In the 1993 amendment to Rule 11, the drafters did not
alter or amend the improper motive prong whatsoever. Solovy et al., supra note 26, at 72728 n.2. Thus, the history of Rule 11 indicates continued support for and belief in the need
for two separate prongs, focusing on two independent sets of concerns.
192
See supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (examining the importance of Rule 11’s
purpose considerations as applied to Rule 23’s typicality requirement); supra text
accompanying notes 127-30. Regarding the general dangers and possible constitutional
implications of class actions led by representatives with improper purposes, see supra note
182.
193
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
189
190
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must determine whether the legal issue upon which the claim is based
occupies the same level of importance and centrality to the
representative as to all absent class members.194 Similarly, adequate
representation requires the court to evaluate whether the named
plaintiffs can ensure the protection of all absent class members’ interests
by demonstrating that their own interest in the litigation is virtually
identical to the absent members’ interests.195 Thus, both Rule 23
requirements demand no less than a thorough consideration of the
purposes behind the filing of the claim, and denying that consideration
deprives the absent class members the protection of being represented by
a party whose substantial and central interests align with their own.196
Second, adopting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11
answers the outcry of concern from the bar, the judiciary, the legislature,
and the general public regarding the growing problems of predatory
class action litigation.197 Integrating the protections of Rule 11 and Rule
23 is a natural reading of the two Rules as their goals complement each
other. Requiring that claims be filed without improper motives under
Rule 11 helps ensure that the class actions are led by litigants and
counsel who will vigorously and thoroughly assert the merits of the legal
issues embodied by their claim.198 Likewise, requiring the central
purpose of the class representative to align with and truly reflect that of
the absent class members supports the Rule 11 prohibition on improper
filings. Requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to bring forth and file only those
claims for which a definitive class of plaintiffs exists who actually share a
central injury reduces the opportunity to file “vexation value” and
“predatory litigation” claims that would violate the improper motive
prong.199
Third, the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 11 jurisprudence, as applied vis-àvis Rule 23’s protections for absent class members, would reinvigorate
the stability and finality of class action judgments.200 Under Hansberry,
due process forbids binding absent class members to judgments in which
they were not adequately represented, and especially when their
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
196
See generally supra notes 115-16.
197
See supra note 61 (examining several points of view from attorneys, the public, and the
judiciary on the problems with class actions pursued for arguably improper motives,
calling them predatory or “vexation value” suits); supra Part II.C (discussing the concerns
Congress expressed in its findings when it recently passed CAFA).
198
See supra notes 104, 182.
199
See supra notes 152, 197.
200
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
194
195
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purported “representatives” acted with interests that conflicted with that
of the absent class members.201 When the judiciary integrates the Rule 11
proper purpose concerns with the Rule 23 considerations, it assures more
thorough protection for the absent class members whose due process
rights would otherwise be jeopardized if the motive of their
representative was ignored.202 Applying the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of Rule 11’s purpose prong to class actions would help
ensure that the absent class members could receive true adjudication of
their rights, and would therefore avoid the unnecessary and
unwarranted impingement of their rights by someone who did not share
their interest in the legal issue at hand.203 This added protection for the
class members, in turn, produces added stability for the legal system,
because by bolstering the typicality and adequate representation prongs
of Rule 23, the loopholes through which collateral attacks may be
brought are minimized.204
Finally, adopting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11
responds to Congress’ concerns regarding the personal incentives of
attorneys who act as class counsel in class action litigation.205 While this
Part has focused on the interests of the class members involved in class
action suits, there are clearly strong personal incentives inherent in an
attorney’s choice to act as class counsel—not the least of which is the
windfall of legal fees.206 There is certainly no way to detach an attorney’s
interest in recovering fees from that attorney’s decision to act as class
counsel. However, unambiguously adopting and enforcing the Seventh
Circuit’s reading of Rule 11 both alerts attorneys to the possible penalties
associated with pursuing blackmail settlements and predatory litigation
and empowers courts to assert those penalties when the attorneys fail to
abide by the Rule.207

See supra notes 104, 113-16, and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting that binding a party to a judgment
or settlement in which that party was inadequately represented violates due process); see
also Woolley, supra note 155, at 571 (calling adequate representation the “touchstone” of
due process).
203
See supra notes 44, 87 and accompanying text.
204
See supra notes 154-58.
205
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
206
Id.; see also supra note 72 (noting the increase in cases where plaintiffs’ recoveries are
small but the attorneys’ awards are large); supra note 73 (asserting that attorneys may sell
out the interest of the class members in order to maximize their own fee recovery); supra
note 126 (observing that the legal fees awarded to class counsel often far outweigh any
expected recovery for the class members).
207
See supra note 75 (noting concerns about class actions being used as “legalized
blackmail” and to leverage unwarranted large settlements); supra notes 72, 84, 126, 135, 182
201
202
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Therefore, in order to simultaneously preserve and respect the
protections afforded absent class members through Rule 23’s typicality
and adequacy requirements, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule
11 must be adopted. The current state of uncertainty caused by the
schism in the circuits’ reading of Rule 11 is increasingly disturbing, as
large class actions continue to grow as a litigation device and are
increasingly federalized through legislation like CAFA. Hence, it is time
to acknowledge the overlapping concerns of Rule 11 and Rule 23, to
adopt a uniform approach to those concerns, and to officially integrate
the Rule 11 consideration of motive or purpose into the class action
certification considerations under Rule 23.
IV. A PROPOSED MODEL OF JUDICIAL REASONING: INTEGRATING THE
IMPROPER MOTIVE PRONG OF RULE 11 IN RULE 23(a) CLASS CERTIFICATION
ANALYSIS
Part IV proposes Model Judicial Reasoning for federal courts to
apply in determining whether or not to certify putative classes for class
action litigation.208 This proposed reasoning provides a uniform
approach to the Rule 11 improper motive prong as it relates to Rule
23(a)’s requirements of typicality and adequate representation. This
uniform approach will eliminate the uncertainty and unfairness
currently engendered by the circuit courts’ competing interpretations
and applications of Rule 11.209 The proposed reasoning adopts the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11 as having two distinct and
independent prongs, thereby giving full effect to the protections afforded
absent class members by Rule 23(a)’s typicality and adequate
representation prongs.210
This Note has demonstrated that adopting such model reasoning
does not require altering, modifying, or changing what currently exists
in the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.211 It is instead a
(examining the influence of improper motives on class counsel, and, in turn, the influence
of improperly motivated class counsel on the class members and the resultant litigation).
208
See supra note 81.
209
See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (using a hypothetical case situation to
illustrate the uncertainty and unfairness presented by the current schism in courts’
approaches to Rule 11).
210
See supra Part II.A.2 (presenting and examining the Seventh Circuit’s approach to Rule
11 inquiries).
211
See, e.g., supra note 31 (noting that even the circuit courts that do not adhere to the
Seventh Circuit’s approach to Rule 11’s improper motive prong acknowledge that the
Seventh Circuit’s approach is dictated by the actual text of the Rule, and that a contrary
approach is taken despite the Rule’s text).
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matter of confirming to courts that the text of Rule 11 must be followed,
not just for its own sake, but to effectuate the protections of Rule 23.
Therefore, this Part proposes judicial reasoning to be used with the
typicality and adequate representation considerations.212 This reasoning
captures the motive requirements of Rule 11, and provides a framework
for applying them to class certification determinations.213 The reasoning
is a two-step process, shaped by the structure of Rule 11, and requires
the court considering whether to certify a putative class to find:
(1) The putative representative has demonstrated the
existence of a non-frivolous claim appropriate for class action
treatment as defined by the requirements of Rule 23(a); and
(2) The court is aware of no evidence, whether formally
presented to the court or of which the court has otherwise
become aware, indicating that the putative class
representative(s) filed the claim identified in Step (1) for any
motive:
(a) which is generally improper [an objective
component], using an approach guided by the
Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence; and
(b) if generally improper, would so endanger the
typicality and adequate representation protections of
Rule 23(a) in the case at hand [a subjective
component] that class certification must be denied to
fully protect the absent class members from the
adjudication of their rights in an action in which they
were not adequately protected, and thus would be
improperly bound to any settlement or judicial
resolution of the claim.214

212
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (setting forth the typicality requirement); FED R. CIV P.
23(a)(4) (establishing the adequate representation element for class certification).
213
What constitutes “improper motive” is guided by the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence.
See supra Part II.A.2. What is generally an improper motive under the current Seventh
Circuit jurisprudence is used to establish the threshold for the objective component of this
Model Judicial Reasoning, but is not in itself the end point of the inquiry.
214
The language of the Model Judicial Reasoning is the author’s own original language,
based in part upon the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning regarding Rule 11’s improper motive
prong.
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A. The Where: Placing Rule 11’s Requirements Within Rule 23(a)’s
Protections
This Model Judicial Reasoning formally adopts the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of Rule 11, thereby acknowledging the drafters’ continued
adherence to the dual-prong structure and the independent concerns of
each prong.215 Thus, a judge faced with the decision of whether or not to
certify a proposed class must find under Rule 11: (1) that the class’s
putative representative established the presence of a colorable, nonfrivolous claim for all members of the proposed class;216 and (2) that
neither the putative representative nor the class counsel demonstrated
any improper motive contrary to or so divergent from the resolution of
the non-frivolous claim in prong (1) such that certification of the putative
class would result in defeating the typicality and adequate
representation protections guaranteed under Rule 23(a)(3) and (4).217
This approach to Rule 11’s independent prongs in class action
situations avoids the problems inherent in forcing a putative class
representative or attorney to affirmatively prove a negative; that is, it
prevents requiring proof that differing motives do not exist among the
class members.218 Rather, this approach acknowledges that where
evidence exists that alerts the court to potential motive conflicts among
the class members (or between the class members and the class counsel),
the court may invoke Rule 11’s improper motive prong as a bar to

215
See supra 191 (identifying a pattern of preserving the dual-prong structure of Rule 11
through its various amendments).
216
This first part of the inquiry is essentially a restatement of the requirement that papers
filed in court be non-frivolous. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The only modification is the explicit
instruction to view the frivolousness issue in the context of all class members, but even that
is not a change so much as a verbalization of the basic inquiry conducted in Rule 23(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
217
The requirement that typicality and adequate representation be assured to absent
class members is not itself a change from what is currently required in class certification
inquiries. See supra Part II.B. The thrust of the proposed reasoning is on the integration of
considerations regarding class representatives’ and counsel’s motives in bringing and
pursuing the claim as part of the currently existing typicality and adequate representation
inquiries. See supra notes 73-77 (assessing the various criticisms and dangers related to
claims pursued by class representatives or class counsel whose purpose is sharply
divergent from that of the absent class members).
218
Avoiding the troubling situation of requiring proof of a negative is important for
maintaining a relatively efficient and “user-friendly” model of reasoning. See, e.g., Gorney,
supra note 81, at 51 (describing the task of proving a negative as an “unenviable posture”
and noting that it “might be easier to prove the sun rises in the west” than to prove the
absence of a fact).
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binding all of the class members to one unified adjudication of the
colorable claim.219
Moreover, this approach acknowledges that claims are often brought
with “mixed motives,” and this approach does not require that all of
those mixed motives claims be barred.220 Instead, this model instructs
the court to reject class certification only for those claims where the
demonstrated motives of the putative representative or the class counsel:
(1) are improper, as per the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11;
and (2) would, if the class was certified, undermine or altogether
eviscerate the Rule 23(a) protections of typicality and adequate
representation.221 Rather than forcing any litigant to prove the absence
of such motives, this Model Judicial Reasoning instead places the focus
of the inquiry on the effect of any such motives on the protections
guaranteed under Rule 23(a).222 Focusing the inquiry on the effect of the
motives, instead of flatly requiring a putative class representative or
counsel to prove their complete absence, also helps sidestep the potential
“chilling” effect of enforcing Rule 11’s improper motive prong.223 Hence,
claims may still be brought even where some mixed motives exist for the
class representatives and for the class counsel, so long as the resolution

See supra note 102.
See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that a lawsuit filed or
pursued with mixed motives is not immediately violative of the Rule 11 improper purpose
prong, so long as the purpose of vindicating the asserted claim remains central and
sincere). Thus, the proposed Model Judicial Reasoning blends the Fourth Circuit’s more
tolerant stance toward mixed motives with the Seventh Circuit’s stricter requirements of
what actually constitutes an improper motive for the purposes of determining whether an
improper motive, rather than vindication of a legal claim, is central.
221
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
222
Focusing the inquiry on the effects of the motives on the Rule 23 protections helps the
proposed reasoning to closely comport with the most prevalent criticisms of current uses
(or misuses) of the class action litigation device. See supra note 61 (setting forth several
criticisms of the current uses of suits motivated by the desire to economically harm or
publicly embarrass a defendant); infra note 223.
223
See Goland, supra note 28, at 477. Goland describes the goal of Rule 11 inquiries as
achieving a balance between allowing the pursuit of legitimate claims while preserving the
integrity of the legal system. Id. The reasoning proposed in this Note achieves that balance
by acknowledging the impossibility of demanding a stark absence of any mixed motives in
class action suits, while still respecting the integrity of the legal system by requiring that
where suits are filed with improper motives outweighing the vigorous pursuit of
vindicating the claim, a court refuse to certify a class and bind issue-focused plaintiffs to a
motive-focused representative’s pursuit of the suit.
219
220
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of the actual claim is of central importance, rather than a secondary (or
nonexistent) afterthought.224
This allows a consideration of both subjective and objective
components. The objective component, encompassed by prong (2)(a) of
the proposed Model Judicial Reasoning, focuses on whether the
questionable purpose is generally “improper.”225
However, the
subjective component, embodied by prong (2)(b) of the proposed Model
Judicial Reasoning, focuses more specifically on whether the
questionable purpose in the case at hand is “improper” relative to its effect
on the protections guaranteed to absent class members by Rule 23(a)’s
requirements of typicality and adequate representation for the class
encompassed by the claim being asserted.226
B. The What and the How:
Considered

What Improper Motive Evidence Should Be

Evidence of improper motives may come to the court’s attention
through varying methods, including a formal presentation of such
evidence to the court in a pleading by a party opposing class
certification, or through more informal means, such as the court’s own
This will also help resolve the sub-split identified within the majority circuits. See
supra note 53. Instead of forcing courts to determine definitively whether “motive X” is
indeed a proper or improper purpose in all cases, it allows the courts to consider mixed
motives, and even allows them to pass judicial muster, so long as the questionably
improper motive does not so overshadow the motive of resolving the claim that typicality
and adequate representation are rendered null. Compare Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss.,
Inc., 277 F.3d 791, 808-09 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding economic embarrassment and harm to be
improper motives that outweighed the legitimate motives of pursuing the claim’s final
resolution), with Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, at 459 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
economic embarrassment is not necessarily an improper motive). Adopting the proposed
judicial reasoning would allow the court, in a class certification determination, to focus its
attention on whether the pursuit of economic embarrassment of a defendant so outweighs
the pursuit of resolution to the identified claim, rather than forcing the court to wrestle
with whether and how to definitively categorize the particular questionable motive itself
(improper versus proper in all cases).
225
See, e.g., Mazurczak, supra note 16, at 106 (asserting that personal or economic
harassment, even where papers are filed non-frivolously, may be improper motives); Re,
supra note 61, at 107 (describing cases pursued and presented for “vexation value” as being
improperly motivated); supra note 26 (noting that Rule 11 specifically identifies delay,
harassment, and unnecessary increase in litigation costs as a non-exclusive list of improper
purposes).
226
An analysis of the integrated Rule 11 and Rule 23(a) inquiry applied subjectively to
the case at hand is necessary, so as to avoid the current problems of some circuits applying
Rule 11 completely objectively, while still being required to apply Rule 23(a) subjectively.
See, e.g., supra notes 25, 43-44 and accompanying text (detailing examples of courts
interpreting Rule 11 as either not having, or not requiring, any subjective inquiry).
224
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weighing of various facts before it. The choice of litigation tactics may
provide such evidence: for instance, in the WSB Electric Company case,
the court supported its finding of improper motives largely on the
plaintiffs’ choice of litigation tactics.227 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs would have filed for injunctive relief if indeed they were
seeking resolution of their asserted claim.228 Instead, the plaintiffs
pursued what the court termed “complex and burdensome litigation,”
thereby amplifying the improper motive of pursuing economic or
political objectives.229
Additionally, the out-of-court methods employed by the litigants or
counsel may demonstrate improper motives. For example, in the
Whitehead case, the Fifth Circuit identified no problems with the litigant’s
or attorney’s choice of litigation tactics, but concluded that the attorney’s
extrajudicial interaction with the media evidenced an improper
motive.230 Because courts already use an attorney’s background and
experience in class action litigation as a factor in determining whether to
appoint them as class counsel under Rule 23(g), the courts could also use
information regarding the attorney’s prior litigation outcomes to
evaluate potential improper motive concerns.231 For instance, if a court
noted that an attorney had led several prior class action suits to
settlement from which he benefited greatly—and disproportionately—to
the benefit received by his client class members, that may be a “red flag”
indicating that close scrutiny is required by the court in order to
determine whether the suit is brought for resolution of the legal claim, or
for further disproportionate monetary or publicity gain for the
attorney.232 The court could also consider for this inquiry the method by
which plaintiff class members were acquired: an attorney’s aggressive
pursuit of class members to bolster a claim may indicate a motive of
personal gain for the attorney outweighing the motive of claim

WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File, 103 F.R.D. 417, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Id. at 420.
229
Id. at 421; see generally supra note 44.
230
See supra text accompanying notes 49 and 53.
231
See supra note 123 (providing the full text of Rule 23(g) and noting that part of the
court’s inquiry toward the putative class counsel must be whether that attorney is capable
of competently prosecuting the suit, allowing an examination of counsel’s prior litigation
experience).
232
See, e.g., supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (examining the dangers to the class
members’ interests engendered by allowing an improperly motivated attorney to act as
class counsel); supra note 135 (offering examples of actual situations in which class
counsel’s gains and benefits far outweighed and were disproportionate to the recoveries
gained by each class member).
227
228
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resolution, as opposed to an attorney’s aggressive pursuit of resolving a
claim for the class members, which would likely indicate the opposite.233
C. The When: When Improper Motive Evidence Should Be Considered
Because this Model Judicial Reasoning approaches Rule 11 improper
motive inquiries relative to and in conjunction with Rule 23(a)’s class
certification requirements of typicality and adequate representation, the
most logical point in a claim’s timeline to conduct the inquiry would be
when the court conducts the required class certification inquiries and
determinations.234 This timing is not only the most logical, but is likely
to be the most efficient as well. As previously noted, several factors a
court should consider regarding the improper motive inquiry align with
elements of determinations the court is already required to make at the
time a class seeks certification and a class counsel seeks appointment.235
Thus, rather than expanding the process to involve some separate and
independent inquiry step, this approach would have the court consider
the Rule 11 improper motive inquiry at the same “early practicable” time
it examines typicality and adequate representation for class
certification.236
V. CONCLUSION: FORGING AHEAD WITH ROADMAP IN HAND
Class actions will continue to be a powerful presence in the
landscape of American litigation, and careful consideration of the
purposes underlying the pursuit of the action will be necessary to ensure
the protection of absent class members’ rights as intended by Rule 23(a).
This Note proposes an approach to examining the motives of the
putative class representative(s) and class counsel to better address the
233
See, e.g., Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(expressing concern and wariness of those small claims that inspire attorneys to solicit
plaintiffs in order to pursue a lawsuit through which the attorney stands to gain significant
fees, but the class members stand to gain very little); supra note 75 (noting several instances
where media coverage of certain products seemed to instigate class action litigation, rather
than widespread injury and lawsuits instigating media coverage).
234
As of the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, a court is required to determine whether or not
to certify a class at “an early practicable time.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Prior versions of
Rule 23 required a certification decision “as soon as practicable after commencement of an
action,” but the 2003 amendments revised the time requirement to better reflect the fact
that class certification determinations may require a significant amount of gathering and
presenting information, termed “certification discovery” by the Advisory Committee. FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note.
235
Regarding class certification requirements, see supra note 78. Regarding class counsel
appointment, see supra note 123.
236
See supra note 234.
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threat of predatory litigation via class actions, and to better align with
Rule 23(a)’s typicality and adequate representation protections, without
chilling parties’ ability to seek class treatment for their claims.
The proposed approach would protect the issue-focused plaintiffs in
the hypothetical situation developed above. Using the proposed
reasoning, the court would deny certification to the class led by motivefocused plaintiffs, because the ulterior motives outweighed the pursuit
of claim resolution, rendering the motive-focused plaintiffs neither
properly “typical” of the issue-focused plaintiffs, nor adequate
representatives for them. By denying certification to the class led by
motive-focused plaintiffs or attorneys, the court would ensure that the
issue-focused plaintiffs’ rights are preserved, and that they are not,
under the Hansberry analysis, unconstitutionally bound to any settlement
or judicial decision reached in the matter. Thus, use of the proposed
Model Judicial Reasoning provides a uniform structure and approach
that will minimize the uncertainty and unfairness currently plaguing the
federal courts faced with class action litigations, while strengthening the
protections guaranteed to absent class members under Rule 23.
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